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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In the wake of accounting abuses at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, 
Qwest, Global Crossing and Tyco, to name a few, “corporate 
governance” has become a household phrase.  These massive corporate 
scandals cast a bright, public spotlight on the failures of directors to act 
as the eyes and ears of stockholders who elected them.1  Yet the very 
role of a board of directors in the system of corporate governance is to 
oversee a corporation’s business and affairs, including its management, 
because numerous dispersed stockholders cannot effectively perform 
that function on their own.2  Thus when management fraud and 
misconduct burgeon, it is presumed that the public is justified in 
pointing a finger at directors for having inadequately supervised 
management. 
But if directors incurred liability for every misstep they took, or bad 
decision they made, it would indeed be rare to find a person willing to 
 1. J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the 
Governance of Public Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 358 (2004) (arguing that 
self-dealing by executive officers during the dot-com and high-tech bubbles suggests a 
lack of oversight by directors, who did not act as meaningful checks on managerial self-
interest); Robert W. Hamilton, The Seventh Annual Frankel Lecture Address: The 
Crisis in Corporate Governance: 2002 Style, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 37 (2003) [hereinafter 
Hamilton, Crisis] (citing James Cheek III et al., A.B.A., Preliminary Report of the 
American Bar Association Task Force on Corporate Responsibility 1, 3-7 (2002)).  
Hamilton, discussing the role of managers, noted: 
And it is a clear failure of corporate responsibility when outside directors, auditors 
and lawyers, who have important roles in our system of independent checks on the 
corporation’s management, fail to avert or even discover—and sometimes actually 
condone or contribute toward the creation of—the grossest of financial manipulations 
and fraud. 
Id.; Marianne M. Jennings, Symposium on Ethics in Corporate Governance: Restoring 
Ethical Gumption in the Corporation: A Federalist Paper on Corporate Governance—
Restoration of Active Virtue in the Corporate Structure to Curb the “YeeHaw Culture” 
in Organizations, 3 WYO. L. REV. 387, 402-05, 441-44, 475-78 (2003) (referring to the 
Enron board as a board full of conflicts of interest and fulfilling a rubber-stamp 
function, the WorldCom board as dominated by the CEO and “not a particularly curious 
board” and the Tyco board as “far too unquestioning” of the CEO and dominated by 
current and former Tyco employees). 
 2. See JAMES HAMILTON ET AL., RESPONSIBILITIES OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND 
DIRECTORS UNDER FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS 28 (2005). 
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serve as a director.3  The balance between holding directors accountable 
for their failures, yet encouraging them to serve and make risky and 
potentially value-creating business decisions, is delicate.4  Corporate 
governance, the framework that defines the relationship between a 
corporation and its officers, directors and stockholders,5 determines this 
balance by setting standards for director conduct and liability. 
The framework for corporate governance is derived primarily from 
state law.6  Under the internal affairs doctrine, the laws of the state of 
incorporation govern the internal affairs of corporations incorporated 
therein.7  To maintain board accountability in the corporate governance 
framework, directors owe fiduciary duties to the stockholders who elect 
them.8  In Delaware, where the majority of U.S. corporations are 
 3. See William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards 
of Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1296 (2001) 
(commenting that given the limited investment in publicly held firms directors are 
typically willing to make, any risk of director liability would dwarf the incentives for 
assuming the role); Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
1055, 1059 (2006) (noting that beyond some level of liability risk, qualified people may 
decide to not serve as directors and those who do serve may become excessively 
cautious). 
 4. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Divergence of Standards of Conduct and 
Standards of Review in Corporate Law, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 437, 444 (1993) (“It is 
often in the interests of shareholders that directors or officers choose the riskier of two 
alternative decisions, because the expected value of a more risky decision may be 
greater than the expected value of the less risky decision.”). 
 5. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 800 (2005); Robert 
B. Thompson et al., Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance: Reflections upon 
Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 864 (2003). 
 6. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 78 (1987); Bus. 
Roundtable v. Sec. Exch. Comm’n, 905 F.2d 406, 408 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see Lyman 
P.Q. Johnson, Corporate Compliance Symposium: The Audit Committee’s Ethical and 
Legal Responsibilities: The State Law Perspective, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 27, 29 (2005) 
(“States, not the federal government, traditionally have regulated corporate 
governance.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson et al., The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Fiduciary 
Duties, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1149, 1992 (2004). 
 7. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 
(1975); see Brown, supra note 1, at 322-23; Marcel Kahan et al., Symbiotic Federalism 
and the Structure of Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1585-86 (2005). 
 8. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993) (“In 
exercising these powers [to manage the business and affairs of the corporation], 
directors are charged with an unyielding fiduciary duty to protect the interests of the 
corporation and to act in the best interests of its shareholders.”); William A. Klein et al., 
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS AND FINANCE 131 (8th ed. 2002); Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the 
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incorporated,9 the hallmark fiduciary duties are the duties of care and 
loyalty.10  These two also involve a duty of candor to the corporation’s 
stockholders.11  These duties are discussed in Part II.  Part II also 
explores a Delaware corporation’s director’s duty to act in good faith, 
explaining the intersection between the duty to act in good faith and the 
hallmark fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.  Procedural mechanisms 
also play an important role in this analysis and can effectively determine 
the outcome of a fiduciary duty derivative suit.  These mechanisms, as 
they relate to the Delaware fiduciary duty analysis, are presented in Part 
II. 
The discussion in Part II focuses on Delaware law not only because 
Delaware is the state of incorporation for most U.S. corporations,12 but 
also because Delaware law often serves as a guide to courts in other 
jurisdictions in establishing their own fiduciary duty case law.13  For that 
reason, Delaware law is often thought of as supplying the national 
corporate law.14
But if Delaware corporate law is considered the national corporate 
Rod, Spoil the Director?  Revitalizing Directors’ Fiduciary Duty Through Legal 
Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 397 (2005) (commenting that fiduciary duties ensure 
that directors exercise their corporate power appropriately). 
 9. Hamilton et al., supra note 2, at 23; Renee M. Jones, Rethinking Corporate 
Federalism in the Era of Corporate Reform, 29 IOWA J. CORP. L. 625, 630, 632 (2004) 
(noting that 85% of out-of-state incorporations are in Delaware).  There have been 
many reasons expounded for the dominance of Delaware corporate law, including its 
expert judiciary along with its specialized trial court system.  Brown, supra note 1, at 
347-48; Jones, supra note 9 at 632; Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 1604.  Further, due to 
the large number of corporations incorporated in Delaware, there is an expansive, 
diverse body of case law that gives practitioners some guidance in determining how the 
Delaware judiciary might rule in a similar factual scenario.  Klein et al., supra note 8, at 
150; Brown, supra note 1, at 347-48; Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, HARV. L. 
REV. 588, 594 (2003). 
 10. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 367; In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holder 
Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 476 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 11. Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 143 (Del. 1997); Cede 
& Co., 634 A.2d at 372 (referring to Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992)). 
 12. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 13. See Brown, supra note 1, at 347 (commenting that Delaware decisions 
interpreting management’s fiduciary obligations are widely followed by other states). 
 14. See Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 1591 (noting that Delaware is the leading 
supplier of corporate law). 
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law, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 200215 is perhaps best described as its 
smash sequel.  Congress enacted The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), in 
July of 2002, largely in response to Enron and other major accounting 
scandals that had shaken public confidence in the integrity of 
management’s financial and accounting practices and the ability of 
gatekeepers16 to detect and prevent those wrongful practices.17  In a 
departure from the historic, limited role of federal securities laws in 
corporate governance, SOX codifies a host of responsibilities for 
directors of public companies and specifies various qualifications for 
board and committee service.18  Part III begins by reviewing the historic 
role of federal securities laws in corporate governance.  Part III then 
turns to SOX and assesses those provisions of SOX that seem to fall 
squarely under the umbrella of corporate governance. 
In conjunction with the passage of SOX, and largely at the behest of 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (the Commission), national 
securities exchanges and associations, which are self-regulatory 
associations (SROs), imposed new corporate governance standards on 
companies with securities listed on those exchanges.  Part III 
summarizes those corporate governance listing standards relating to 
board composition and conduct, and explains how they relate to SOX. 
By implementing corporate governance reform at the federal level, 
Congress has delivered a message that the balance between director 
accountability and enfranchisement must be tipped towards the former.  
Yet Congress did not include a mechanism for stockholders to enforce 
SOX’s corporate governance mandates under federal securities laws, nor 
has SOX expressly preempted state law as the primary source of the 
 15. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 11 U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C.). 
 16. “Gatekeepers” refers to outside directors, external auditors and external 
counsel, as they are the primary outsiders who serve as a check on management. 
 17. See Hamilton, Crisis, supra note 1, at 45 (noting that President Bush and the 
Republican-controlled House of Representatives recognized that the mood of America 
with respect to corporate governance changed radically after major accounting scandals 
at Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, Global Crossing, Qwest, Xerox, Rite Aid, 
ImClone and Merck, among others, and that an immediate legislative response was 
viewed as essential). 
 18. See discussion infra Part III.  A “public company” refers to a company with a 
class of securities traded on a national stock exchange or with a class of securities 
having more than 500 record holders and with more than one million dollars in total 
assets.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(a), 781(g) (2000); 17 C.F.R. 240.12g-1 (2002). 
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corporate governance system.19  Thus, any right to enforce those 
mandates is expected to come from state fiduciary duty law, the primary 
avenue available to stockholders to enforce directors’ duties.20  As Part 
IV presents, several recent court decisions reflect an increased focus on 
directors’ oversight responsibilities after the passage of SOX, suggesting 
that the courts are starting to incorporate, post-Reform, new expectations 
of directors into fiduciary duty law.  While not uprooting the 
components or function of fiduciary duties, these cases indicate a 
refocusing of existing fiduciary duty law to bring about increased 
oversight by independent directors with financial experience.  Part IV 
also explains how these duties may continue to shift, with the eyes of 
corporate America, Delaware judges and wary stockholders, on 
boardroom activity. 
By refocusing fiduciary duty law, Delaware courts seem to be 
carrying out the SOX corporate governance mandates and the SRO 
corporate governance listing standards (together referred to as the 
Reform), at the state law level.  But unlike the rules-based Reform, 
fiduciary duty law is standards based.21  This means that state fiduciary 
duty law develops as cases come before the Delaware judiciary.  This 
allows state fiduciary duty law to be flexible and adaptive in response to 
changing norms.22  But particularly important in a climate of corporate 
change, it also provides some uncertainty as to what is required to 
satisfy a director’s fiduciary duties.  With the shifting of indefinite 
standards of director conduct, how does a director know whether she has 
satisfied her fiduciary duties?  That is undoubtedly the question directors 
are asking themselves.  Part V suggests how directors might comply 
with their evolving fiduciary duties. 
 19. See Brown, supra note 1, at 375 (arguing that SOX does not alter the fiduciary 
standards applicable to officers and directors or to improve the procedural mechanism 
used to supplant substantive review); Johnson et al., supra note 6, at 1150 (arguing that 
SOX only modestly preempts fiduciary duties and noting that SOX does not contain an 
enforcement mechanism available to stockholders).  See also discussion infra Part III.D. 
 20. See Brown, supra note 1, at 375. 
 21. Johnson et al., supra note 6, at 1151; Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 1598; see 
also William B. Chandler III et al.., Views From the Bench: The New Federalism of the 
American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of 
One Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953, 960 (2003) (noting that the Reform is 
proscriptive while fiduciary law is enabling). 
 22. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 1598 (noting the flexible and highly fact-intensive 
nature of Delaware judge-made law). 
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II.  TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES 
Directors, as representatives elected to represent the interests of 
stockholders, owe fiduciary duties to those stockholders because they act 
on behalf of those stockholders.23  In Delaware, the hallmark fiduciary 
duties of directors are of care and loyalty.24  These duties are discussed 
in Parts II.A and II.B below.  Parts II.C and II.D review two other duties 
which have traditionally been subsumed in the duties of care and 
loyalty—the duty of disclosure and the duty to act in good faith.25
Stockholders can enforce directors’ fiduciary duties through either a 
direct suit on behalf of that stockholder, where there is damage personal 
to that stockholder, or through a derivative suit to enforce the directors’ 
duties on behalf of the corporation.26  The risk associated with allowing 
a stockholder to sue on behalf of a corporation is that quality directors 
may be hesitant to serve or make aggressive business decisions for fear 
of facing litigation over a “bad” decision.27  To address that risk, and the 
risk of courts second-guessing board decisions, Delaware courts 
presume that in making a business decision, directors acted in good 
 23. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 360 (Del. 1993); Fairfax, 
supra note 8; but see infra note 33 (challenging the ability of stockholders to elect and 
remove directors). 
 24. See Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 367; In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holder 
Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 476 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 25. Stockholders can also seek to hold directors liable for committing corporate 
waste.  Directors are liable for committing corporate waste where they approve “an 
exchange that is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could 
conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.”  In re Walt Disney 
Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub 
nom. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000) [hereinafter Disney I].  Proving waste 
is exceptionally difficult.  According to the Delaware Supreme Court, recovery under 
the waste doctrine is “confined to unconscionable cases where directors irrationally 
squander or give away corporate assets.”  Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263.  Because waste is 
exceptionally difficult to prove and seems to play a limited role in the Delaware courts’ 
fiduciary duty analyses, it is not discussed further herein.  See Jaclyn J. Janssen, In re 
Walt Disney Company Derivative Litigation: Why Stockholders Should Not Put Too 
Much Faith in the Duty of Good Faith to Enhance Director Accountability, 2004 WIS. 
L. REV. 1573, 1597 (2004) (noting that Delaware judges are reluctant to undertake a 
substantive review under the waste doctrine). 
 26. See DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1 (2005). 
 27. See generally, Eisenberg, supra note 4 (arguing that business decisions are 
necessarily made on the basis of incomplete information and in the face of obvious risk, 
so that a range of decisions is reasonable). 
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faith, on a fully informed basis, and in an honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interest of the corporation.28  This presumption is 
referred to as the business judgment rule.29  Stockholders challenging 
director action can overcome that presumption only by showing that the 
board either breached its duty of loyalty, duty of care, or duty of good 
faith.30  If a plaintiff successfully rebuts the business judgment rule, the 
burden then shifts to the defendant directors to prove that the transaction 
was fair to the stockholders.31  This requires a showing that the 
transaction was the product of fair dealing and fair price.32  Of course, if 
stockholders are unhappy with board decisions, they can either vote the 
board members out of office at the next election or sell their stock.33  
Delaware also has several other procedural barriers that protect directors 
from stockholder derivative suits for unwise or bad decisions.  Those 
procedures are discussed below in Part II.E. 
 28. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 
(Del. 1984)). 
 29. Id.; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
 30. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361; Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 91 
(Del. 2001); but see discussion infra Part II.D as to the duty of good faith. 
 31. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361; Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 
A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 1989). 
 32. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361. 
 33. The ability of stockholders of public companies to vote directors out of office 
has been questioned by many commentators who argue that stockholders have little 
power to nominate new directors to the board, and thus only have the power to consider 
and approve management’s nominees.  See, e.g., Seth W. Ashby, Strengthening the 
Public Company Board of Directors: Limited Shareholder Access to the Corporate 
Ballot vs. Required Majority Board Independence, 2005 ILL. L. REV. 521, 528 (2005) 
(commenting that the stockholder franchise is only ceremonial because executive 
management controls whose name appears on the corporate ballot); Chandler et al., 
supra note 21, at 999 (“As of now, incumbent slates are able to spend their companies’ 
money in an almost unlimited way in order to get themselves reelected.  As a practical 
matter, this renders the corporate election process an irrelevancy . . . .”); Leo E. Strine 
Jr., Derivative Impact?  Some Early Reflections on the Corporation Law Implications of 
the Enron Debacle, 57 BUS. LAW. 1371, 1377 (2002) (arguing that the nominating 
committee tilts in favor of the incumbent directors and the incumbent’s and 
management’s candidates over candidates nominated by stockholders). 
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A.  Duty of Care 
1.  Business Decision Context 
The business and affairs of a Delaware corporation are managed by 
or under its board of directors.34  The duty of care requires that directors 
inform themselves of all material information reasonably available 
before voting on a transaction.35  A board can retain consultants or other 
advisors in becoming informed, and is protected in relying on 
statements, information and reports furnished by those advisors, so long 
as it does so in good faith, and selected the advisors with reasonable 
care.36  Under the business judgment rule, a board that has approved a 
specific action will be presumed to have acted in good faith, on a fully 
informed basis, and in an honest belief that the action taken was in the 
best interest of the corporation.37  To rebut that presumption, and to 
establish that a board breached its duty of care, a plaintiff must prove 
that the board failed to inform itself of all material information 
reasonably available and that failure amounted to gross negligence.38
One of the most significant duty of care cases in the last thirty years 
is Smith v. Van Gorkom.39  In Van Gorkom, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that the board of Trans Union had breached its duty of care in 
approving a merger at a meeting called on one day’s notice and without 
 
 34. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005). 
 35. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985). 
 36. Section 141(e) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL), provides as 
follows: 
A member of the board of directors, or a member of any committee designated by the 
board of directors, shall, in the performance of such member’s duties, be fully 
protected in relying in good faith upon the records of the corporation and upon such 
information, opinions, reports or statements presented to the corporation by any of the 
corporation’s officers or employees, or committees of the board of directors, or by any 
other person as to matters the member reasonably believes are within such other 
person’s professional or expert competence and who has been selected with 
reasonable care by or on behalf of the corporation. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (2005). 
 37. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 360; Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 
1984). 
 38. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812. 
 39. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Brown, supra note 1, at 340 (arguing that Van 
Gorkom is the only significant Delaware Supreme Court case in the last thirty years 
which has resulted in the inapplicability of the business judgment rule and the 
imposition of liability on directors of a public company for breach of the duty of care). 
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having received any information as to the merger other than a statement 
by the chairman that the merger price was fair.40  The board of Trans 
Union was not entitled to the benefit of the business judgment rule 
presumption because of its failure to act on an informed basis, and was 
held liable.41
Van Gorkom gave directors a wake up call; it made them realize the 
possibility of personal liability for their board service.  The Delaware 
legislature reacted a year later by enacting Section 102(b)(7) of the 
Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL).42  Under Section 
102(b)(7), a corporation may waive monetary damages arising from a 
director’s breach of the duty of care by including a charter provision to 
that effect.43  But no director may be relieved or “exculpated” from 
liability where she is found to have acted in bad faith, breached her duty 
of loyalty, or to have knowingly violated law or engaged in 
misconduct.44  As a result, directors of Delaware corporations are 
generally not liable for breaching their duty of care, unless exculpation 
is precluded by one of the noted exceptions in Section 102(b)(7).45
Under Section 145(a) of the DGCL, a corporation may indemnify a 
director for any liability arising out of her service as a director, but only 
for actions in good faith which she reasonably believed were in, or not 
 40. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 867-69, 881, 884. 
 41. Id. at 884. 
 42. Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001) (noting that the 
Delaware legislature enacted Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL the year after Van Gorkom 
was decided); Cinerama, Inc. v Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1156, 1166 n.18 (Del. 
1995) (noting that Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL was a legislative response to the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s liability holding in Van Gorkom). 
 43. Section 102(b)(7) of the DGCL provides as follows: 
(b) In addition to the matters required to be set forth in the certificate of incorporation 
by subsection (a) of this section, the certificate of incorporation may also contain any 
or all of the following matters: . . . (7) A provision eliminating or limiting the personal 
liability of a director to the corporation or its stockholders for monetary damages for 
breach of fiduciary duty as a director, provided that such provision shall not eliminate 
or limit the liability of a director: (i) for any breach of the director’s duty of loyalty to 
the corporation or its stockholders; (ii) for acts or omissions not in good faith or which 
involve intentional misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) under § 174 of this 
title; or (iv) for any transaction from which the director derived an improper personal 
benefit. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.; see also Black et al., supra note 3, at 1060 (noting that Van Gorkom is the 
only case where outside directors made out-of-pocket payments after a trial). 
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opposed to, the best interest of the corporation.46  While indemnification 
under Section 145 does not absolve a director from liability as in the 
case of a Section 102(b)(7) charter provision, it does permit a director to 
be made whole for any loss or damages incurred as a result of a 
fiduciary duty suit against her, so long as indemnification is not 
statutorily precluded.47
Considering the business judgment rule presumption, and in light of 
the prevalence of exculpatory charter provisions, it is not surprising that 
no Delaware court since Van Gorkom has premised director liability 
solely on a breach of the duty of care.48  This has led several 
commentators to conclude that the fiduciary duty of care exists only as 
an aspirational and unenforceable standard.49
2.  Oversight Context 
Even when not faced with a business decision, a board must 
oversee the business and affairs of the corporation on which it serves 
under Section 141(a) of the DGCL.50  The board’s exercise of this 
oversight function is not entitled to the benefit of the business judgment 
rule presumption because there is no business decision to presume 
correct.51  Thus the business judgment rule does not apply where a board 
abdicates its responsibility to oversee a corporation’s business and 
affairs, or where it fails to act absent a conscious decision to not act.52  
In the alternative, where a board consciously decides to not act, this 
choice does in fact amount to a business decision.53
One of the first duty of care cases in the oversight context was 
Graham v. Allis Chalmers.54  In this case, several stockholders of Allis-
 
 46. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §145(a) (2005). 
 47. Indemnification is only meaningful where the corporation is solvent and can 
make good on its indemnity undertaking.  See Black et al., supra note 3, at 1083-84. 
 48. Klein et al., supra note 8, at 157; Black et al., supra note 3, at 1060. 
 49. Jones, supra note 9, at 648 (citing Klein et al., supra note 8, at 151-54); see 
also Thompson et al., supra note 5, at 866 (commenting that absent violations of 
loyalty, good faith or some intent to harm the corporation or its stockholders, directors 
are exculpated from liability for a breach of their fiduciary duty of care). 
 50. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2005). 
 51. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Graham v. Allis Chalmers, 188 A.2d 125, 127 (Del. 1963).  In Allis Chalmers, 
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Chalmers sued four convicted employees and the directors, seeking to 
recover fines paid by the company for violating antitrust laws.55  Though 
the defendant directors proved that they did not know about the 
violations, the plaintiffs argued that the directors should have known 
about the violations as they should have put a system in place designed 
to bring any antitrust activity to their attention.56  The Delaware 
Supreme Court did not buy this argument, holding that “absent cause for 
suspicion there is no duty upon the directors to install and operate a 
corporate system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing which they have 
no reason to suspect exists.”57  Applying this principle, the court found 
that the Allis-Chalmers directors did not breach their duty of care, for as 
soon as they had grounds to suspect that employees were engaging in 
anticompetitive activities, they acted promptly to end those activities and 
to prevent them from recurring.58
Perhaps the most significant oversight case, decided nearly thirty 
years after Allis Chalmers, is In re Caremark International Inc. 
Derivative Litigation.59  In Caremark, Caremark was assessed fines for 
violating an anti-referral payments law prohibiting health care providers 
from paying any form of remuneration to doctors or hospitals to induce 
the referral of Medicare or Medicaid patients.60  Caremark was found to 
have violated the law despite its adoption and implementation of a guide 
specifying the types of contracts it was able to enter into with physicians 
and hospitals under the anti-referral law, and its implementation of an 
internal audit plan to audit compliance with that guide.61  Several 
stockholders brought a derivative suit against Caremark’s directors, 
alleging that they breached their duty of care by failing to detect and 
Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Company and four of its employees were convicted for 
violating federal antitrust laws and were assessed fines for these violations.  Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 127, 130. 
 57. Id. at 130. 
 58. Id. at 130-31. 
 59. In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 
1996).  In Caremark, the Chancery Court was asked to approve the terms of a 
settlement as “fair and reasonable” under Chancery Court Rule 23.1.  Id. at 960.  But 
the court took the opportunity of the settlement order to expound on the duty of care in 
the oversight context. 
 60. Id. at 961-62. 
 61. Id. at 962-63. 
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prevent Caremark’s illegal activities.62
In its decision, the Delaware Chancery Court distinguished the duty 
of care in the context of a board decision from the context of 
unconsidered inaction.63  In the board decision context, the duty of care 
requires that the board decision be the product of a good faith effort by 
the directors to be informed and to exercise judgment.64  According to 
the Chancery Court, this inquiry looks to the process employed and not 
the substance of the board decision.65  But where a board is not 
considering any decision, compliance with its duty of care requires that 
the board ensure that the corporation functions within the law to achieve 
its purpose.66  In performing this function, the court cautioned that a 
board needs to consider the organizational sentencing guidelines, which 
may result in significant sanctions on corporations for misdeeds.67  
Moreover, a board needs relevant and timely information to satisfy this 
oversight role.68  To be reasonably informed under this duty, a board 
must determine, in its good faith judgment, 
[t]hat information and reporting systems exist in the organization 
that are reasonably designed to provide to senior management and to 
the board itself timely, accurate information sufficient to allow 
management and the board, each within its scope, to reach informed 
judgments concerning both the corporation’s compliance with law 
and its business performance.69
But “only a sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise 
oversight—such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable 
information and reporting system exits [sic]—will establish the lack of 
good faith that is a necessary condition to liability.”70  While the 
Caremark obligation to establish a reporting system appears to 
contradict the Delaware Supreme Court’s holding in Allis-Chalmers, 
relieving directors from the duty to install and operate a “corporate 
system of espionage to ferret out wrongdoing,” the Chancery Court 
 62. Id. at 964. 
 63. Id. at 967. 
 64. Id. at 968. 
 65. Id. at 967-68. 
 66. Id. at 969. 
 67. Id. at 970. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 971. 
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interpreted Allis-Chalmers narrowly to eliminate any perceived 
conflict.71
B.  Duty of Loyalty 
The fiduciary duty of loyalty mandates that a director exercise 
undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation on whose board he 
serves, and that he place the best interests of the corporation and its 
stockholders ahead of any interest of his own, any officer, or any 
controlling stockholder not shared by the other stockholders.72  Classic 
examples of director self-dealing involve either a director appearing on 
both sides of a transaction or a director receiving a personal benefit from 
a transaction not received by the corporation’s stockholders.73  The 
business judgment rule presumption applies to a board’s decision, 
notwithstanding that the transaction being approved is an interested 
party transaction.74  But Delaware courts are given flexibility in 
determining whether a director’s interest in a transaction is sufficiently 
material so as to constitute a breach of the duty of loyalty, and thus not 
entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule.75  Where a 
plaintiff demonstrates a breach of this duty, the burden shifts to the 
defendant directors to prove that the transaction is fair to the 
stockholders.76
To avoid the need for a court determination of the fairness of every 
challenged interested party transaction, there is a mechanism in 
Delaware to remove the “interested director cloud.”77  This mechanism, 
codified in Section 144(a) of the DGCL, provides that a transaction in 
which a director is interested is not void, or voidable, if either a majority 
of disinterested directors or a majority of stockholders, in good faith, 
authorizes the transaction after full disclosure.78  For this purpose, a 
 
 71. See id. at 969. 
 72. Cede & Co. v. United Technicolor, 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993); Guth v. 
Loft, 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939). 
 73. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 362. 
 74. Id. at 363. 
 75. Id. at 364. 
 76. Id. at 361; Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1279 (Del. 
1989). 
 77. Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 365-66. 
 78. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2005).  Section 144(a) of the DGCL does not 
preclude an interested director from being involved in the decision-making process in 
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director is considered disinterested if he does not appear on both sides of 
a transaction, nor expects to derive a material personal financial benefit 
from the transaction.79  Where either a majority of disinterested directors 
or a majority of stockholders approves in good faith an interested party 
transaction, a court will apply the business judgment rule to the decision 
to enter into that transaction.80
C.  Duty of Candor/Disclosure 
The duty of candor mandates that directors disclose all available 
material information to stockholders when obtaining their approval.81  
Omitted information is “material” if a reasonable stockholder would 
consider it important in deciding how to vote.82  To prove a breach of 
the duty of candor outside of the context of an interested party 
transaction, a stockholder must show that the information omitted from a 
stockholder solicitation was material and reasonably available, and a 
reasonable stockholder would consider that information important in 
deciding how to vote.83  A director will only be required to pay damages 
for a breach of the duty of candor where the breach impaired the 
economic or voting rights of stockholders, and even then may be liable 
for only nominal damages.84  Moreover, a board that breaches its duty of 
candor is entitled to exculpation under a Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory 
charter provision.85
In the context of an interested party transaction, the duty of candor 
mandates that directors not use superior information or knowledge to 
 
which she is interested.  The duty of disclosure is discussed infra in Section C. 
 79. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 23 (Del. Ch. 2002). 
 80. Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n.3 (Del. 1987).  Some commentators 
believe that the business judgment rule applied in that context is heightened from that 
which applies in the non-interested party context.  See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 
455 (arguing that no approval of a self-interested transaction by disinterested directors 
will prevent a court from applying a “smell” test that is more rigorous than the business 
judgment rule). 
 81. McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910 (Del. 2000); Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-
Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 143 (Del. 1997); Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 372 (referring to 
Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992)). 
 82. McMullin, 765 A.2d at 925; Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 
(Del. 1985). 
 83. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d at 143. 
 84. Id. at 142. 
 85. Id. 
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mislead stockholders voting on the transaction.86  According to the 
Delaware Supreme Court, this duty is one of the “elementary principles 
of fair dealing.”87  Where stockholders are not provided with all material 
information reasonably available when approving an interested party 
transaction, that approval is ineffective under Section 144(a) of the 
DGCL for purposes of removing the interested party taint.88  Thus, the 
board must prove the fairness of the transaction though it may be 
difficult to prove fair dealing in light of the omitted disclosure.89
This broad duty of candor is quite different from the disclosure 
mandates of federal securities laws, laws enumerating in detail what 
must be disclosed to stockholders of public companies.90  But Delaware 
courts have historically looked to federal securities law disclosure 
standards in shaping the state fiduciary duty of disclosure.91
D.  Duty of Good Faith 
Delaware courts have at times referred to a “triad” of fiduciary 
duties, encompassing the duties of care, loyalty and good faith.92  But 
Delaware courts have traditionally not held that a separate duty of good 
faith exists.93  They also have not clearly defined what good faith means 
beyond stating that it involves the need to act in the best interests of the 
stockholders.94  In one case, the Delaware Chancery Court held that bad 
 
 86. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1283 (Del. 1989). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a) (2005); see also discussion supra Part II.B. 
 89. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 366 (Del. 1993). 
 90. The federal securities law disclosure regime is discussed infra in Part III. 
 91. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (adopting 
federal materiality standard). 
 92. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90 (Del. 2001); Cede & Co., 
634 A.2d at 361; McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000). 
 93. Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good Faith in Director Conduct: Are 
Delaware Courts Ready to Force Corporate Directors to Go Out-of-Pocket After 
Disney IV?, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 531, 545 (2005) (“Case law demonstrates the courts’ 
historical uncertainty as to whether good faith is an independent duty, a component of 
the duty of care, or a component of the duty of loyalty.”); see Janssen, supra note 25, at 
1581 (noting the debate among Delaware judges as to whether a distinct duty of good 
faith exists); see, e.g., Cede & Co., 634 A.2d at 361, 367 (referring to the “triad” of 
fiduciary duties, but subsequently referring to the duties of care and loyalty as the 
traditional hallmark fiduciary duties). 
 94. See, e.g., Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989) 
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faith may be inferred where a decision is so far beyond the bounds of 
reasonable judgment it seems essentially inexplicable on any ground 
other than bad faith.95  This formulation of bad faith seems to allow an 
inference of a bad faith mental state when, in looking at the substance of 
a decision, a court cannot find any other basis for that decision.  Still, 
this formulation does not explain what bad faith means, or when a bad 
decision will lead to an inference of bad faith.  On the other hand, the 
Delaware Chancery Court’s formulation of bad faith in Caremark leads 
to an inference of bad faith where there is an “utter failure to attempt to 
assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists [sic].”96  
This formulation focuses on the process employed by the board when 
determining bad faith, inferring a bad faith mental state where an 
inadequate information-gathering process is employed.  According to 
some commentators, a lack of clarity in defining and interpreting good 
faith has prevented it from traditionally commanding attention in 
stockholder suits.97
E.  Demand Futility and the Special Litigation Committee 
Delaware law provides that a stockholder may commence a 
derivative suit to enforce a cause of action on behalf of a corporation.98  
Where a stockholder intends to bring a derivative action to enforce a 
director’s breach of a fiduciary duty, Delaware Chancery Rule 23.1 
requires that the stockholder first make demand on the board to proceed 
with that cause of action.99  This demand requirement reveals that even 
in the face of litigation, the board retains power to oversee corporate 
affairs.100  But this demand requirement is dispensed with where it 
 
(equating good faith with loyalty); Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 14 n.3 (Del. Ch. 
2002) (“[T]he duty to act in ‘good faith’ is merely a subset of a director’s duty of 
loyalty . . . .”); In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holder Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 476 (Del. 
Ch. 2000) (explaining that good faith is a “fresh” way to refer to the duty of loyalty). 
 95. In re J.P. Stevens & Co. S’holder Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 780-81 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 96. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. Ch. 
1996) (describing bad faith in the oversight context). 
 97. Dunn, supra note 93, at 545; see also Janssen, supra note 25, at 1583 (arguing 
that conflicting approaches to the duty of good faith made it an ambiguous concept). 
 98. DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1 (2006); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). 
 99. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811. 
 100. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 785-86 (Del. 1981). 
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would be futile.101  The rationale behind this demand futility exception is 
to save stockholders the expense and delay of making a demand likely to 
result in a tainted exercise of authority by the board.102  To show 
demand futility, a plaintiff must create a reasonable doubt that the 
directors are disinterested and independent, or that the challenged 
transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.103
Traditionally, to prove a director’s non-independence in the context 
of demand futility, a plaintiff must show that the director’s decision was 
based on extraneous considerations rather than the corporate merits of 
the matter before the board.104  This is generally shown where a director 
is dominated or controlled by an interested party.105  A director is 
interested when he will receive a personal financial benefit from a 
transaction not shared by the stockholders, or where a corporate decision 
will have a materially detrimental impact on him but not on the 
corporation or its stockholders.106  The possible threat of liability as a 
result of a director having approved a challenged transaction is generally 
insufficient to show that the director either is interested or not 
independent.107
Even where demand is excused, the board retains the right to make 
decisions regarding corporate litigation.108  Thus a board has the power 
 101. DEL. CT. CH. R. 23.1 (2006). 
 102. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 786. 
 103. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.  A court will not apply the Aronson test for demand 
futility where the board considering the demand did not make the business decision 
being challenged, such as where the decision was made by the board of a corporation 
but a majority of the directors who made the challenged decision have been replaced, 
where the subject of the derivative suit is not a business decision of the board or where 
the decision being challenged was made by the board of a different corporation.  Rales 
v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 933-34 (Del. 1993).  In those cases, a court will examine 
whether a majority of the board could have properly exercised its independent and 
disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand.  Id. at 934. 
 104. Rales, 634 A.2d at 936; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816. 
 105. Rales, 634 A.2d at 936; Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815. 
 106. Rales, 634 A.2d at 936. 
 107. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815.  In contrast, where a plaintiff establishes that a board 
acted for entrenchment purposes, that is sufficient to exclude the requirements of 
demand.  Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1189 (Del. Ch. 1998).  See also 
Grobow v. Perot, 526 A.2d 914, 923 n.12 (Del. Ch. 1987) (acknowledging that under 
certain circumstances, directors’ fees might become so lavish that they might alone 
establish a director’s interest). 
 108. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 786 (Del. 1981). 
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to decide whether dismissal of litigation is in the best interests of the 
corporation.109  The board has this authority, even if fellow directors are 
involved in the litigation, so long as the authority over litigation is 
delegated to an independent committee of disinterested directors, often 
referred to as a special litigation committee (SLC).110  Delaware courts 
acknowledge the inherent risk of abuse, however subconscious, in those 
circumstances.111  To address this, courts place the burden of proving: 
that the SLC was comprised of independent, disinterested directors; that 
those directors conducted a reasonable investigation; and that they 
reached, in good faith, a business judgment that the litigation is not in 
the best interest of the corporation, on the corporation.112  To determine 
whether SLC members are independent, courts generally analyze 
whether the members were able to independently conduct investigations 
and prepare reports regarding the decision to grant a motion to 
dismiss,113 considering factors such as whether the SLC members were 
on the board at the time of the challenged action, and whether they were 
named as defendants in the action.114  But even if a corporation 
sufficiently proves each of these factors, a court will still apply its own 
independent business judgment to determine whether or not dismissal of 
the litigation is proper.115
III.  FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS AND SRO LISTING STANDARDS AS 
SOURCES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
A.  Historic Role of Securities Laws and SRO Listing Standards 
While traditional notions of fiduciary duties derive from state 
common law, fiduciary duties, to an extent, have also been shaped by 
federal securities laws and SRO listing standards.  Federal securities 
laws generally regulate public companies by mandating disclosures that 
must be provided to investors, ensuring that investors have enough 
 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 787. 
 112. Id. at 788. 
 113. See id.; Lewis v. Fuqua, 502 A.2d 962, 967 (Del. Ch. 1985); Kaplan v. Wyatt, 
484 A.2d 501, 519 (Del. Ch. 1984). 
 114. See Lewis, 502 A.2d at 966-67. 
 115. Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 789. 
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information about those companies to make investment decisions.116  
Many of the disclosure requirements relate to corporate governance 
practices.  For example, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934,117 known 
as the Exchange Act, requires each public company to disclose, in its 
annual report to stockholders, whether or not it has standing audit, 
nominating and compensation committees; if it does not, it must explain 
why.118  While merely a disclosure rule, this requirement obligates a 
board to either establish those committees, or form a basis for not having 
them, which must then be disclosed to investors.  In this way, federal 
securities laws influence director conduct by regulating disclosure.119  
The Exchange Act has historically regulated some corporate governance 
practices directly, particularly those affecting stockholders’ voting 
franchise.120  But there, too, the focus has been on implementing a 
process that ensures stockholders receive full and fair disclosure.121
The national stock exchanges and associations have also regulated 
some conduct falling within the ambit of corporate governance.122  For 
 116. Hamilton et al., supra note 2, at 13-14; Hazen, supra note 5, at 799; Thompson 
et al., supra note 5, at 909 (noting that the original premise for disclosure was to 
decrease information asymmetries and thereby to improve market efficiency through 
accurate information, while stopping short of creating a body of federal corporate law). 
 117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a et seq. (2006). 
 118. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-101, Item 7(d)(1) (2005). 
 119. Brown, supra note 1, at 350-52 (noting instances where the Commission used 
disclosure to force changes at the board level); Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 974 
(“[M]any federal disclosure requirements have had the natural and (presumably) 
intended consequence of influencing boardroom practices.”). 
 120. See Roe, supra note 9, at 632-33 (arguing that in the 1990s, even before SOX, 
federal authorities were adjusting the balance between managers and stockholders in 
proxy contests, stockholder proposals and institutional investor voice); Thompson et al., 
supra note 5, at 870 (arguing that the most significant and direct extension into the 
corporate governance realm occurs when proxies are solicited to gain stockholder votes 
which may be required by state law).  Other securities laws mandate specific conduct, 
but they generally relate to specific types of companies or securities.  See, e.g. THE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT OF 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 et seq. (regulating mutual 
funds and other investment companies), and THE TRUST INDENTURE ACT OF 1939, 15 
U.S.C. § 77aaa et seq. (regulating bonds, debentures and other similar debt securities 
offered for public sale and issued under large trust indentures). 
 121. 15 U.S.C. § 78n et seq.; 17 C.F.R. 240.14a; see also Thompson et al., supra 
note 5, at 871 (noting that federal law regulates the process of disclosure where 
stockholder participation is solicited). 
 122. Richard M. Leisner, Sarbanes-Oxley: How it Affects Small Businesses—Public 
and Private, The Practitioner’s Guide to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § II-8-21 (2004) 
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instance, since the 1970s, both the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 
and the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) have 
required listed companies to have a specified number of independent 
directors on their audit committees.123  One of the SROs’ primary goals 
in regulating corporate governance matters has been to lend stability to 
capital markets by permitting access only to issuers with “good” 
governance practices.124  But the SROs’ corporate governance 
requirements have not traditionally been particularly burdensome or 
substantial.125  Moreover, the most severe remedy for a violation of SRO 
listing standards is delisting, a result that does not punish the directors 
responsible for a corporation’s failure to comply with corporate 
governance listing standards.126  In addition, listing securities with an 
SRO is voluntary.  Thus, a corporation can avoid being subject to an 
SRO’s listing standards by either not listing or de-listing its securities.127
B.  The Enactment of SOX and SRO Corporate Governance  
Listing Standards 
While the pre-2002 state-federal-SRO corporate governance 
balance seemed to function adequately during the stock market boom of 
the 1990s, it may have become imbalanced following the dot-com and 
telecom bubble bursts.128  As the economy began to contract in 2000 and 
 
[hereinafter Leisner]. 
 123. American Bar Association, Special Study on Market Structure, Listing 
Standards and Corporate Governance, 57 BUS. LAW. 1487, 1507 (2002). 
 124. Id. at 1497.  Some SROs have also passed listing standards directed toward 
corporate governance as a way to create a brand name associated with high quality.  Id. 
 125. Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 973 (“The Exchanges have played a more 
mixed role, through listing requirements and the rules of some diversity, but generally 
with non-burdensome effects.”). 
 126. Brown, supra note 1, at 372; Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 983. 
 127. The consequence of de-listing, however, is that there will not be an established 
market for trading in those securities.  Interestingly, only about half of all public 
companies have securities listed for trading with one of the SROs.  Leisner, supra note 
122, § II-8-24 to 25. 
 128. See John C. Coffee, Jr., What Caused Enron?  A Capsule Social and Economic 
History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269, 271-72 (2004) (arguing that the 
explosion of financial irregularities in 2001 and 2002 were the natural and logical 
consequence of trends and forces that had been developing for some time, including the 
end of the stock market bubble and the emergence of a system of corporate governance 
where corporate managers were accountable to the market); see also Hamilton, Crisis, 
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2001 at the end of the dot-com and telecom booms,129 stock prices began 
to plummet, leading to staggering investor losses and market 
skepticism.130  That skepticism seemed to grow with every new financial 
restatement indicating that management had managed earnings to inflate 
stock prices, enabling them to receive large cash bonuses and payouts 
upon the exercise of options.131  Additionally, the failures of accounting 
firms and directors to keep those accounting abuses in check became 
widely known and criticized.132  Whatever may have caused the massive 
supra note 1, at 13, 16 (noting the bursting of the dot-com bubble in 2000 as the dot-
com businesses began to disappear, and the collapse of the telecommunications industry 
in early 2001 as it became clear that overcapacity would be a problem); Larry E. 
Ribstein, In the Wake of Corporate Reform: One Year in the Life of Sarbanes-Oxley—A 
Critical Review Symposium Issue: SARBOX: The Road to Nirvana, 2004 MICH. ST. L. 
REV. 279, 281 (2004) (arguing that the bubble atmosphere was created by several 
factors, including the nurturing, at Enron and others, of a breed of highly competitive, 
unrealistically over-confident, and ultimately unethical business people, the creation of 
new business techniques which made financial statements opaque, and the 
disappearance of a healthy skepticism). 
 129. See Hamilton, Crisis, supra note 1, at 13, 16. 
 130. Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1524-25 (2005) (noting that in 2002 there was a shift 
in public mood regarding big business, coinciding with the high-profile corporate 
scandals and financial distresses as well as a sharp decline in the stock market); Joel 
Seligman, F. Hodge O’Neal Corporate and Securities Law Symposium: Conflicts of 
Interest in Corporate and Securities Law: No One Can Serve Two Masters: Corporate 
and Securities Laws After Enron, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 449, 466-67 (2002) (noting that the 
number of restatements grew from 116 in 1997 to 305 in 2001, and that following 
Enron, newspapers were reporting a market-wide dampening of stock prices because of 
uncertainty as to whether the accounting, auditing and corporate governance problems 
at Enron would prove to be widespread). 
 131. See Coffee, supra note 128, at 297-98 (arguing that managerial incentives 
changed in the 1990s as executive compensation shifted toward being equity-based, 
encouraging management to engage in short-term rather than long-term price 
maximization); Seligman, supra note 130, at 477 (noting various factors that 
undermined investor confidence in financial information and market efficiency, 
including the dramatic reversal of public companies’ financial conditions, 
corresponding with significant losses by investors, the revelation of accounting 
irregularities at public companies, including at well-regarded companies, and the 
number of financial restatements). 
 132. See Coffee, supra note 128, at 300-01 (arguing that under the irrational market 
theory, during a market bubble, gatekeepers increase their financial positions by 
acquiescing in managerial misbehavior); see also Brown, supra note 1, at 357 (arguing 
that with the collapse of Enron, the market confronted widespread examples of 
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accounting abuses and seeming breakdown in firm ethos, directors were 
caught in the middle, as they are the linchpin in the system of corporate 
governance. 
Congress responded to the accounting scandals, major corporate 
collapses, and sinking investor confidences without delay, enacting SOX 
eight months after Enron’s bankruptcy, and a mere nine days after 
WorldCom’s collapse.133  In fact, the Congressional record relating to 
the passage of SOX is replete with references to Enron and the failures 
of its directors to detect and prevent accounting improprieties.134
SOX not only adds disclosure requirements relating to matters of 
public company corporate governance, but also mandates additional 
oversight duties and specifies independence criteria for directors serving 
on public company audit committees.135  SOX further aims to strengthen 
the audit committee by requiring disclosure of financial expertise on the 
audit committee.136  As many commentators have noted, SOX regulates 
corporate governance of public companies more aggressively than 
previously effectuated through federal securities laws.137
It is curious that Congress moved so quickly and pointedly into the 
corporate governance arena, given its historic, limited role in the field, 
corporate excess which, while checked during the 1990s, were lost in the euphoria of a 
growing economy and a booming stock market); Ribstein, supra note 128, at 282 
(noting that gatekeepers may have failed to keep management in check because they 
had too much loyalty to the executives who hired them or who controlled their income). 
 133. See Hamilton, Crisis, supra note 1, at 13, 40 (noting that the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act was the immediate response to the corporate governance crisis following the 
collapse of the dot-com and telecom bubbles). 
 134. See S. COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, S. Rep. No. 107-
205 (June 26, 2002), reprinted in 107 S. Rpt. 205 (July 3, 2002) [hereinafter SENATE 
REPORT] (mentioning Enron twelve times). 
 135. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 136. See id. 
 137. See Hazen, supra note 5, at 800 (noting a departure after SOX from the 
dichotomy where the states had defined officers’ and directors’ duties and federal 
securities laws had regulated information provided to investors); Chandler et al., supra 
note 21, at 959 (“[T]he 2002 Reforms appear to be a relatively aggressive move by the 
federal government and the Exchanges into the realm of board decision making and 
composition, an area where traditionally, the states have been predominant.”); Johnson 
et al., supra note 6, at 1150 (noting that SOX makes unprecedented federal inroads into 
the area of corporate governance); Thompson et al., supra note 5, at 874 (noting that 
post-SOX, the Exchange Act defines federal standards of directors’ responsibilities in 
the ordinary operation of business enterprises). 
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instead of leaving regulation of corporate governance to the states.  
Several theories have been advanced to explain this departure.  
According to some academics, there was immense political pressure on 
Congress to react quickly and visibly after Enron and other accounting 
“scandals,” in order to restore investor confidence in the capital 
markets.138  Another view is that states may not have been capable of 
providing a satisfactory response to the systemic weakness in board 
oversight of management.139  Others argue that states may have avoided 
enacting burdensome or controversial legislation in an effort to avoid 
losing corporate charters to other states with less burdensome 
legislation.140  In addition, state courts might not have been able to 
respond quickly, due to their adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis, 
and their need to wait for cases to properly come before them before 
effecting any change in fiduciary duty law.141  Whatever the reason, 
 138. See Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 957 (arguing that the Reform is typical of 
major remedial measures that result from our political process, suffering from the 
rapidity of enactment and a tendency to deal with many issues superficially and 
sporadically); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Symposium: Crisis in Confidence: Corporate 
Governance and Professional Ethics Post-Enron Sponsored by Wiggin & Dana: The 
Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just Work), 35 
CONN. L. REV. 915, 917 (2003) (arguing that Congress used the episodic power 
opportunity created by the parade of accounting and corporate governance scandals to 
pass SOX); Hamilton, Crisis, supra note 1, at 45-46 (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act was the only piece of corporate governance legislation in the pipeline at the time 
the list of accounting scandals had broadened to include Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, 
Tyco and Global Crossing, among others, yet an immediate legislative response was 
viewed as essential); see also Romano, supra note 130, at 1527-29 (discussing the 
trumped political process involved in the passage of SOX). 
 139. See Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 1588-89 (arguing that in a time of crisis or 
scandal, the federal government will intervene since it is at that time that Delaware’s 
lack of political legitimacy is made and resonates); but see Dunn, supra note 93, at 535 
(arguing that Delaware’s courts were crafting their guidance to the new corporate 
governance environment before the collapses of Enron and WorldCom). 
 140. See Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 1590, 1594-95 (noting political constraints 
placed on Delaware which prevent it from making systemic changes in fiduciary duty 
law due to jurisdictional and conflict rules, and also noting the rarity of the legislature 
overturning judge-made corporate law). 
 141. Dunn, supra note 93, at 541; Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 1598-99 (noting that 
the Delaware Supreme Court rarely overrules its own precedents and instead justifies its 
rulings by qualifying them as applicable to a narrower set of circumstances or as having 
been misinterpreted by lawyers or lower court judges); see also E. Norman Veasey, 
Counseling Directors in the New Corporate Culture, 59 BUS. LAW. 1447, 1451 (2004) 
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Congress placed itself directly and undeniably in the corporate 
governance field by enacting SOX with the goal of enhancing the 
independent oversight of corporate executives whose misdeeds had 
undermined investor confidence.142
C.  Provisions of SOX and SRO Rules Affecting Corporate Governance 
Many SOX provisions increase the oversight responsibilities of 
boards of directors of public companies acting through their audit 
committees.143  SOX defines an audit committee as a committee formed 
for the purpose of “overseeing the accounting and financial reporting 
processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the 
issuer.”144  Perhaps the best example of the duties that SOX places on 
public company audit committees is the requirement that they be 
responsible for the appointment, compensation and oversight of external 
auditors.145  Under this rule, the external auditor of every public 
company must report directly to the audit committee when performing 
audit and other services, not to management, which traditionally had 
been the practice.  SOX also requires the audit committee to establish 
procedures for the receipt, retention and treatment of complaints 
regarding the company’s accounting and auditing practices.146  These 
procedures must include a method for employees to submit confidential, 
anonymous concerns regarding questionable accounting or auditing 
 
[hereinafter Veasey, Counseling Directors] (“Courts need to be stable without wild 
doctrinal swings.”). 
 142. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 134; see also Fairfax, supra note 8, at 400 
(commenting that SOX was an effort to restore directors’ adherence to their fiduciary 
duties); Thompson et al., supra note 5, at 876 (noting that Congress passed SOX to 
combat the corporate governance problems seen in the recent corporate crisis).  
Congress presumably has the power to preempt state law governing internal corporate 
affairs under the Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution.  
Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 1578. 
 143. Some commentators suggest that SOX does not reform corporate governance, 
but rather implements best practices, many of which were already being followed.  See, 
e.g., Cunningham, supra note 138, at 941-42. 
 144. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 205, 116 Stat. 745, 773-74 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c(a)(58)) (adding Section 3(a)(58) to the Exchange Act). 
 145. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 775 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(m)(2)) (adding Section 10A(m)(2) to the Exchange Act). 
 146. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(m)(4)) (adding Section 10A(m)(4) to the Exchange Act). 
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matters directly to the audit committee.147
These provisions were aimed at bringing about the audit 
committee’s active oversight of the external auditor’s audit as well as 
management’s accounting practices, in an effort to enhance the 
committee’s ability to monitor and eradicate improper accounting 
practices.148  As part of this duty, the audit committee is tasked with 
communicating directly with the external auditor concerning not only 
the audit, but also any accounting or financial matter or concern.149  It is 
presumed that having the external auditor report directly to the audit 
committee, instead of to management, reduces the risk that the external 
auditor will agree with management’s accounting practices merely to 
continue the engagement.  That, in turn, is expected to reduce the risk 
that the auditor will become complacent with management’s accounting 
practices as a result of a conflict of interest.  Having the audit committee 
be more actively engaged in the audit process also better enables the 
audit committee to grasp the relevant accounting issues that the 
corporation faces. 
SOX also requires that each public company have an audit 
committee comprised completely of independent directors.150  In its 
promulgating release, the Commission directed the SROs to adopt rules 
consistent with this requirement.151  As directed, the SROs adopted rules 
 147. Id. 
 148. SENATE REPORT, supra note 134, at Title III.A; Standards Relating to Listed 
Company Audit Committees, 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 240, 249 and 274 (2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8220.htm [hereinafter Section 301 
Release]; see Jonathan H. Gabriel, Misdirected?  Potential Issues with Reliance on 
Independent Directors for Prevention of Corporation Fraud, 38 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 
641, 648 (2005) (noting that the appointment and oversight by the audit committee of 
the external auditor establishes a relationship free of barriers to forthright discussion 
which might exist where management insiders are responsible for the continued 
employment of the auditors). 
 149. See James Hamilton & N. Peter Rasmussen, CCH Inc., GUIDE TO INTERNAL 
CONTROLS UNDER SECTION 404 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT 13 (2004) [hereinafter 
Hamilton & Rasmussen] (discussing the extensive new responsibilities of audit 
committee members under SOX); Fairfax, supra note 8, at 401-02 (noting the extensive 
accounting and financial responsibilities placed on audit committee members). 
 150. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 116 Stat. at 776 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-
1(m)(3)) (adding Section 10A(m)(3) to the Exchange Act).  In the Commission’s 
implementing rules, it modified slightly the definition of independence.  See 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.10A-3(b)(1). 
 151. See Section 301 Release, supra note 148. 
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mandating wholly independent audit committees.152  Under the 
corporate governance rules adopted by the NYSE and NASD in 
conjunction with SOX, the board of each listed company must determine 
whether a director is independent based on his or her relationship with 
the company.153  Those rules do not, however, leave the finding of 
independence entirely up to the board.  Instead, they specify factors that 
preclude a finding of independence, including instances where a 
director: holds an office with a corporation; has any business 
relationships with the corporation; or receives any compensation from 
the corporation, other than directors’ fees.154  These independence rules 
also contain look-back periods and affiliate attribution provisions, 
further expanding their scope.155
The NYSE and NASD also require a majority of the members of 
the board of each listed company to be independent,156 and that those 
independent directors meet regularly in executive sessions without 
inside directors present.157  Still further, the SROs require each listed 
company to establish a compensation committee and nominating and 
governance committee comprised exclusively of independent 
directors.158  These rules are clearly intended to make the board 
generally, and these committee members in particular, independent from 
management and other influences that might affect a director’s 
independent judgment in performing her responsibilities.159
Section 402 of SOX, also aimed at director independence, restricts 
the ability of directors to receive non-ordinary course loans from the 
 152. See NASDAQ, Inc. Listed Company Manual § 4350(d)(2) (2006) [hereinafter 
NASDAQ Manual], available at http://www.nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/ 
index.html; NYSE, Inc. Listed Company Manual § 303A.07 (2006) [hereinafter NYSE 
Manual], available at http://www.nyse.com/regulation/rules/1098571481177.html. 
 153. See NASDAQ Manual, supra note 152, § 4200(a)(15); NYSE Manual, supra 
note 152, § 303A.02. 
 154. See NASDAQ Manual, supra note 152, § 4200(a)(15); NYSE Manual, supra 
note 152, § 303A.02. 
 155. See NASDAQ Manual, supra note 152, § 4200(a)(15); NYSE Manual, supra 
note 152, § 303A.02. 
 156. See NASDAQ Manual, supra note 152, § 5350(c)(1); NYSE Manual, supra 
note 152, § 303A.01. 
 157. See NASDAQ Manual, supra note 152, § 5350(c)(2); NYSE Manual, supra 
note 152, § 303A.03. 
 158. See NASDAQ Manual, supra note 152, § 4350(c)(3); NYSE Manual, supra 
note 152, §§ 303A.04-.05. 
 159. See Section 301 Release, supra note 148. 
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public companies on whose boards they serve.160  This provision was 
intended to address investors’ concerns about loans to insiders, abundant 
at Enron, and their desire to know about these loans promptly after they 
are made “in order to better inform their investment decisions.”161  
While that concern may justify a loan disclosure rule, it does not explain 
SOX’s approach of banning most loans to officers and directors.  By 
enacting this provision, Congress has appeared to plant a corporate 
governance restriction on public companies rather than cultivating an 
enhanced system of disclosure, as had been the traditional method that 
federal securities laws played a part in corporate governance.162
It is generally believed that directors failed to detect and prevent 
many of the recent accounting scandals due to their close ties with 
management.  In the case of the audit committee members, these close 
ties seemingly impaired their ability to neutrally oversee the audit of 
financial statements and firm accounting practices.163  Thus, the intent 
behind these rules was to eliminate competing personal interests that 
might compromise an audit committee member’s ability to perform his 
functions.164  While mandating independent committee composition 
 160. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 402, 116 Stat. 745, 787-88 (2002) (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78m(k)) (adding Section 13(k) to the Exchange Act).  There are some 
exceptions to this ban, but they are rather narrow.  See id. 
 161. SENATE REPORT, supra note 134, at Title IV.D. 
 162. Many commentators have criticized the overbroad and inflexible nature of 
Section 402.  See, e.g. Brown, supra note 1, at 361; Roe, supra note 9, at 633.  For 
example, Section 402 seems to prohibit a director from receiving an advance of 
litigation costs, as it is not a permitted exception, though this is permitted under many 
states’ corporation laws and is generally considered as beneficial to a corporation.  See 
James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation on Director and Officer 
Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 BUS. LAW. 1207, 1226-27 (1998) (noting 
the states that permit advances of litigation costs).  Because of some of the potentially 
unintended consequences of Section 402, and the lack of Commission guidance on this 
rule, on October 15, 2002, a group of law firms issued an outline describing loans they 
considered to be outside of the scope of this section.  Alston & Bird LLP et al., 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Interpretive Issues Under 402 – Prohibition of Certain Insider 
Loans 3-8 (2002), at http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/pdfs/loan1002.pdf. (last 
visited Feb. 9, 2007).  The outline concludes that advances of litigation costs fall 
outside of Section 402’s prohibition on loans. 
 163. SENATE REPORT, supra note 134, at Title III.A; see also Ribstein, supra note 
128, at 282. 
 164. SENATE REPORT, supra note 134, at Title III.A; Leisner, supra note 122, § V-3-
4;  see also Roel C. Campos, Remarks of SEC Commissioner, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 
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does not ensure that directors act independently, an independent board 
process likely flows from having only directors without ties to 
management performing oversight and decision-making functions.  As 
Commissioner Roel C. Campos has observed, “directors who are 
supposed to be independent should have the guts to be a pain in the neck 
and act independently.”165
While there are clearly benefits to having independent directors on 
the board and board committees, there are drawbacks as well.  For one, 
an independent director’s lack of any firm knowledge about a company 
outside of his role as a director might impair his ability to perform his 
strategic oversight role.166  According to a study performed by 
Professors Sanjai Bhagat and Bernard Black, having a higher percentage 
of independent directors does not, by itself, improve firm 
performance.167  Nonetheless, the presence of independent directors on a 
board seems to give that board and its committees an appearance of 
impartiality,168 an appearance important to restoring investor confidence 
in the board’s ability to oversee and prevent managerial impropriety in 
an environment of stockholder skepticism.169
527, 529 (2005) (noting that having strong and independent oversight by the board to 
keep management “in check” is a necessary framework). 
 165. Campos, supra note 164, at 539. 
 166. Lynne L. Dallas, The Multiple Roles of Corporate Boards of Directors, 40 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 781, 783-84 (2003) (arguing that inside directors perform the strategic 
role, focused on developing and implementing corporate strategy, better than outside 
directors); see Ashby, supra note 33, at 544 (arguing that companies whose boards are 
composed of a large proportion of independent directors may incur significant 
information costs to compensate for the independent directors’ lack of communication 
channels). 
 167. Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Non-Correlation Between Board Independence and 
Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 248-49 (2002). 
 168. See Kenneth B. Davis, Jr., Structural Bias, Special Litigation Committees, and 
the Vagaries of Director Independence, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1305, 1355 (2005) (noting, in 
the context of a SLC, that among the most important conditions for investors to feel 
satisfaction from fair treatment is neutrality and the feeling that their fate is in the hands 
of an unbiased decision-maker who is honest and who uses appropriate factual 
information to make a decision); Strine, supra note 33, at 1375 (arguing that corporate 
law has proceeded on the premise that truly independent directors can have a 
meaningful beneficial influence in ensuring corporate decisions are made impartially 
and with integrity). 
 169. A number of commentators have criticized Congress’ failure to include within 
SOX a change in the process by which directors are nominated.  See, e.g., Brown, supra 
note 1, at 373 (noting that SOX did nothing to alter the director nomination process, and 
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While SOX emphasizes the importance of having independent 
directors on the audit committee, it also underscores the need to have a 
financially educated and experienced audit committee.170  To that end, 
SOX requires every public company to disclose whether its audit 
that to the extent nominations are controlled or influenced by the CEO, boards are likely 
to contain independent directors who remain closely aligned with the CEO); Chandler 
et al., supra note 21, at 999 (noting that the incumbent slates are able to spend their 
companies’ money in almost an unlimited way to get themselves reelected).  The 
critique has focused on the failure of SOX to remove management’s involvement in the 
director nomination process.  See Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 999.  Certainly a 
nominating committee comprised only of independent directors can be expected to 
bring about a more independent nomination process than a committee comprised of 
insiders.  However, SOX does not remove management from the nomination process, 
nor does it open up a company’s proxy statement to stockholder nominees.  Ashby, 
supra note 33, at 543; Strine, supra note 33, at 1377.  Thus the risk remains that the 
incumbent slate will become overly comfortable in its position and become less 
sensitive to stockholder input.  Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 999.  The Commission 
has proposed rules which would require an issuer to include in its proxy statement a 
director nominee named by long-term stockholders who own a significant amount of 
stock where the proxy process has been ineffective or stockholders are dissatisfied with 
that process.  See Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
48626, Investment Company Release No. 26206, to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240, 
249, 274 (proposed Oct. 23, 2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/ rules/proposed/34-
48626.pdf.  But those proposed rules have stagnated due to controversy surrounding 
their passage.  See Summary of Comments: In Response to the Commission’s Proposed 
Rules Relating to Security Holder Director Nominations, Exchange Act Release No. 34-
48626, Investment Company Release No. 26206 (2004), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/extra/s71403summary.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) 
(describing the different challenges to the Commission’s proposed rule relating to the 
security holder director nomination process).  A number of activist stockholders have 
decided to take this bull by the horns, requesting that management include in company 
proxy statements bylaw amendments which would give stockholders the right to include 
their director nominees in the company’s annual proxy statements for the election of 
directors.  See e.g. Hewlett-Packard Co., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A), at 22-23 
(Jan. 23, 2007).  This trend will likely continue as stockholders are successful at placing 
their nominees on the board. 
 170. SENATE REPORT, supra note 134, at Title IV.I (noting that the audit 
committee’s effectiveness depends, in part, on “its members’ knowledge of and 
experience in auditing and financial matters”); see Campos, supra note 164, at 533 
(“Someone on the audit committee should have enough familiarity in preparing or 
working with financial statements to be able to probe the financials prepared by 
management.”). 
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committee includes a financial expert, and if not, to explain why not.171  
An audit committee financial expert is generally someone with an 
understanding of the audit committee’s oversight role and has expertise 
in accounting matters, as well as an understanding of financial 
statements.172  The Commission’s rules specify how an audit committee 
member must have acquired that knowledge and expertise.173  Both the 
NYSE and NASD take this concept to the next level, requiring the audit 
committee of every listed company to contain at least one financial 
expert, and that all members of the audit committee be, or become, 
financially literate.174
Enhancing the competence of audit committee members is also 
clearly intended to improve the ability of the committee to oversee the 
audit and preparation of financial statements.  A director with substantial 
accounting and financial experience is presumed to be better able to 
recognize accounting manipulations and spot other accounting and 
financial issues quicker than directors without that experience.175  Still, 
 171. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407, 116 Stat. 745, 790 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7265).  There was significant resistance to SOX’s audit committee financial expert 
disclosure requirement, as no director wanted to incur liability under securities laws for 
being an expert.  To address this concern, the Commission excluded the audit 
committee financial expert from the category of “experts” who, under securities laws, 
have an increased exposure to liability.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 406 and 407, 116 Stat. 
at 789-790 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265 ); see also Disclosure Required by Sections 
406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229 and 249 
(2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 
2007) [hereinafter Section 407 Release]; Correction, 17 C.F.R. pts. 228 and 229 (2003), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8177a.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2007). 
 172. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407, 116 Stat. at 790 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265); see 
also Section 407 Release, supra note 171, § II.A.4(c)-(d). 
 173. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407, 116 Stat. at 790 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7265); 
see also Section 407 Release, supra note 171, § II.A.4(c)-(d).  The types of experiences 
include the active supervision of the preparation, audit, analysis and evaluation of 
financial statements.  See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 407, 116 Stat. at 790 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 7265); see also Section 407 Release, supra note 171, § II.A.4(c)-(d). 
 174. See NASDAQ Manual, supra note 152, § 4350 (d)(2)(A) (requiring that each 
audit committee member be able to read and understand fundamental financial 
statements); commentary to NYSE Manual, supra note 152, § 303A.07(a) (requiring 
that each member of the audit committee be financially literate, or become financially 
literate, within a reasonable period of time after his or her appointment to the audit 
committee). 
 175. See Campos, supra note 164, at 533; see also supra note 170 and 
accompanying text. 
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these rules do not require the audit committee financial expert to have 
any special involvement in performing the audit committee’s oversight 
function.  While it stands to reason that a director with special expertise 
will use that expertise in furtherance of his board duties, SOX does not 
dictate heightened involvement.  As Part IV shows, however, a 
director’s expertise appears to be increasingly important in the fiduciary 
duty context. 
In addition to tasking the audit committee with oversight of 
accounting and financial matters, SOX charges the audit committee with 
receiving and addressing complaints from external counsel regarding 
material violations of securities laws or fiduciary duties involving the 
corporation or its directors and officers.176  Under this rule, an external 
counsel’s complaint must initially be reported to, and investigated by, a 
firm’s chief legal counsel, or a qualified legal compliance committee 
(QLCC) comprised of at least one member of the audit committee and 
other independent directors.177  If the chief legal counsel decides to 
investigate the complaint but does not take action satisfactory to external 
counsel to address that complaint, external counsel is required to report 
its complaint “up the ladder” to the audit committee.178  Consequently, 
despite any lack of legal expertise, the audit committee members, or 
QLCC members, may need to decide what action to take to address an 
alleged violation of securities laws or fiduciary duties reported to them, 
while doing so in compliance with their own fiduciary duties. 
The provisions of SOX discussed above are those that seem to fall 
squarely within the field of corporate governance.  Section 404, 
however, targeted principally at improving the quality of financial 
reporting,179 plays an equally important role in defining the duties of 
directors.  Section 404 focuses on “internal controls over financial 
reporting,” referring to the process that a corporation uses to assure the 
reliability of its financial reporting and the preparation of its financial 
statements based on the risks facing the company.180  Internal control 
 176. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 116 Stat. at 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245); see 
also Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys, 17 C.F.R. part 
205 (2002) available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8185.htm. 
 177. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 307, 116 Stat. at 784 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7245). 
 178. See id. 
 179. Hamilton & Rasmussen, supra note 149, at 11. 
 180. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 116 Stat. at 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262); see 
also Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting and 
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systems pervade every corporate enterprise, and include systems 
designed to provide assurances as to the effectiveness and efficiency of 
operations, reliability of financial reporting and compliance with law.181  
Section 404 and the implementing release require each public company 
to include in its annual report a statement that management is 
responsible for establishing and maintaining adequate internal controls 
over financial reporting, along with management’s assessment of the 
effectiveness of those controls.182  The company’s external auditor must 
then attest to, and report on, management’s assessment.183
This requirement to establish internal control systems is not new.184  
But by requiring that management assess the effectiveness of those 
controls, and that the auditor attest to that assessment, SOX significantly 
Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 
229, 240, 249, 270 and 274 (2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-
8238.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2007) [hereinafter Section 404 Release]; Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board Auditing Standard No. 2, An Audit of Internal Control 
over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with an Audit of the Financial 
Statements (AS No. 2), available at http://www.pcaobus.org/standards_and_related_ 
rules/auditing_standard_no.2.aspx (last visited Mar. 2, 2007); Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board Proposed Auditing Standard, An Audit of Internal Control 
Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated With an Audit of Financial Statements, 
available at  http://www.pcaobus.org/rules/docket_o21/2006-12-19_release_no_2006_ 
007.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). 
 181. See Section 404 Release, supra note 180; see also Hamilton & Rasmussen, 
supra note 149, at 19 (noting that internal controls extend to “policies, plans, 
procedures, processes, systems, activities, functions, projects, initiatives and endeavors 
of all types at all levels of a company”). 
 182. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 116 Stat. at 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262); 
Section 404 Release, supra note 180.  Each public company must file an annual report 
at the end of each fiscal year and a quarterly report at the end of each other fiscal 
quarter.  See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78o(d) (codified at Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the 
Exchange Act). 
 183. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404, 116 Stat. at 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7262); 
Section 404 Release, supra note 180.  Smaller companies have been granted continual 
grace periods from these assessment and attestation requirements due to their 
disproportionately costly effect on them.  See Internal Control Over Financial Reporting 
in Exchange Act Periodic Reports of Non-Accelerated Filers and Newly Public 
Companies, 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 228, 229, 240 and 249 (2006), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8760.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2007). 
 184. See  Roberta S. Karmel, Realizing the Dream of William O. Douglas—The 
Securities and Exchange Commission Takes Charge of Corporate Governance, 30 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 79, 102 (2005) (stating that the internal control requirement dates back to 
the 1977 amendments to the Exchange Act). 
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expands the level and scope of diligence required by both management 
and auditor, as to internal controls.  This is a much more time-
consuming and costly endeavor than the more superficial testing 
auditors performed prior to SOX in order to deliver their audit reports.185
While a complete understanding of Section 404 necessitates an 
understanding of complex accounting rules and standards, the 
implication for audit committees is clear: while management is tasked 
with creating and assessing a public company’s internal controls based 
on the risks that company faces, the audit committee must oversee the 
design and operation of those internal controls and ensure their 
effectiveness.186  Further, the audit committee must oversee the 
remediation of any internal control deficiencies.  As Commissioner 
Campos poignantly noted, presumably based on this internal controls 
requirement, “[a]udit committees and independent directors must take 
more affirmative roles in rooting out accounting and internal control 
issues.”187
Other SOX provisions seem to have more lofty goals.  Specifically, 
SOX and the Commission’s implementing rules require that each public 
company disclose whether or not it has adopted a code of ethics 
covering the conduct of its principal financial officers, principal 
accounting officers and principal executive officer and if not, explain 
why not.188  Generally, a code of ethics must specify standards 
reasonably designed to deter wrongdoing and be designed to promote 
honest and ethical conduct, avoidance of conflicts of interest, 
compliance with laws, and inclusion of full, fair and timely disclosure in 
reports filed with the Commission.189  Expanding on this notion, the 
NYSE and NASD have adopted corporate governance rules requiring 
listed companies to adopt codes of ethics covering their directors, 
officers and employees.190  While public companies without a listed 
 185. See AICPA, Internal Control Assessment by Management, Key Issues for 
Management, Mar. 13, 2003, available at http://www.aicpa.org/download/sarbanes/ 
key%20issues%20document%20-%20FINAL.pdf. 
 186. Leisner, supra note 122, § I-67 n.141; Hamilton & Rasmussen, supra note 149, 
at 13. 
 187. Campos, supra note 164, at 537. 
 188. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406, 116 Stat. 745, 789 (2002) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§ 7264); see also Section 407 Release, supra note 171. 
 189. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 406, 116 Stat. at 789 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 7264). 
 190. See NASDAQ Manual, supra note 152, § 4350(n); NYSE Manual, supra note 
428 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
class of securities are not bound by these SRO rules, it is presumed that 
they will decide to adopt a code rather than having to explain why they 
did not.191
According to the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, the rationale for the code of ethics rule was to inform 
investors as to whether a company “holds its financial officers to certain 
ethical standards in their financial dealings.”192  Yet by requiring that a 
code of ethics also apply to the chief executive officer and in the case of 
a listed company, to employees, the Commission and SROs appear to be 
striving to have “the focus on doing the right thing become part of the 
DNA of a company and everyone in the company from top to 
bottom.”193  The SROs have attempted to impose board oversight over 
compliance with ethics codes by requiring board approval of waivers for 
directors and executive officers.194
D.  SOX and SRO Rules Step into the Ring with Fiduciary Duties 
For companies subject to the Reform, this patchwork of corporate 
governance requirements has been superimposed on top of the existing 
corporate governance framework, creating a bundle of outside director 
responsibilities and qualifications aimed at enhancing the boards’ ability 
to oversee corporate insiders and corporate information-gathering 
systems.195  But the Reform neither expressly supplants state law, nor 
sets forth an overall scheme of corporate governance.196  Thus state law 
 
152, § 303A.10. 
 191. See Leisner, supra note 122, § III-4-4 (arguing that it is hard to imagine a 
public company offering a reasonable explanation for not adopting a code of ethics). 
 192. SENATE REPORT, supra note 134, at Title IV.H. 
 193. See Hamilton et al., supra note 2, at 22 (referring to the report to the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York on Corporate Governance for the 
future of MCI, Inc., commonly referred to as the Breeden Report (2003)). 
 194. See NASDAQ Manual, supra note 152, § 4350(n); commentary to NYSE 
Manual, supra note 152, § 303A.10. 
 195. See Johnson et al., supra note 6, at 1209 (“The new federal rules largely accept 
as given state law’s structural allocation of decision-making responsibility within 
corporations.”). 
 196. See Brown, supra note 1, at 320 (arguing that SOX was a reaction to specific 
problems arising out of the corporate governance scandals and not a mechanism to fill 
systematically the void created by the lack of meaningful standards at the state level); 
Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 982 (noting that the Reform does not constitute a 
comprehensive body of substantive corporation law); Johnson et al., supra note 6, at 
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appears to have retained its role as the principal fabric of which the 
corporate governance framework is made.197  Moreover, neither SOX 
nor the SROs’ listing standards create a mechanism for private 
enforcement of their corporate governance mandates.198  Instead, any 
private right of enforcement of these mandates exists solely under state 
law.199
Have Delaware courts been responding to stockholder calls for 
enforcement of the Reform’s corporate governance mandates?  It is 
difficult to tell because Delaware courts must wait for cases to come 
before they can create case law reflecting a shift in corporate governance 
standards.200  Moreover, because of their adherence to the doctrine of 
stare decisis, Delaware courts often try to reconcile their decisions with 
existing case law rather than making clear pronouncements of new 
law.201  Nevertheless, several recent court decisions suggest the 
Delaware courts are increasingly focused on directors’ performance of 
1195 (arguing that the federal intervention is partial and selective). 
 197. See Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 982; Johnson et al., supra note 6, at 1150 
(arguing that SOX only modestly preempts fiduciary duty law); see also Cort v. Ash, 
422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (“[E]xcept where federal law expressly requires certain 
responsibilities of directors with respect to stockholders, state law will govern the 
internal affairs of the corporation.”). 
 198. Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 982; Johnson, supra note 6, at 29; Johnson & 
Sides, supra note 6, at 1195.  Where there is a violation of an SRO listing standard, the 
SRO may be able to do any or all of the following: halt trading in the listed securities; 
issue a public reprimand letter; and de-list the violating issuer’s securities.  See 
NASDAQ Manual, supra note 152, §§ 4120, 4300, IM4300; NYSE Manual, supra note 
152, §§ 303A.13, 801-09. 
 199. Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 3, at 1133 (noting that their study did 
not uncover a single instance where Commission enforcement against outsider directors 
for oversight lapses yielded a civil penalty); Chandler & Strine, supra note 21, at 982 
(noting that the absence of a clear path for aggrieved stockholders to press claims in the 
federal courts under the Reform may generate new types of state corporate law cases); 
Johnson, supra note 6, at 29; Johnson et al., supra note 6, at 1195 (referring to the 
absence within SOX of a built-in interpretive, adjudicative or enforcement mechanism 
accessible to stockholders); but see Thompson et al., supra note 5, at 904 (noting that as 
federal disclosure obligations have increased, they have begun to provide the basis to 
enforce duty of care obligations). 
 200. Kahan et al., supra note 7, at 1576, 1598 (noting that legal change in a common 
law model of lawmaking such as in Delaware results in legal change that is slow, 
standards-based and incremental). 
 201. Id. at 1598. 
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their oversight function without undue influence by insiders.202  This 
might be a good indication that the Delaware courts are beginning to 
reexamine the duties of directors in the current corporate climate.203  
This evolution in fiduciary duties is explored in Part IV. 
IV.  DELAWARE FIDUCIARY DUTIES TAKE CENTER STAGE,  
AGAINST THE BACKDROP OF THE REFORM 
While the Reform affects a number of significant corporate 
governance changes, it does not apply to all boards.  Most SOX 
provisions only apply to public companies.204  Further, the SROs’ 
governance listing standards only apply to companies listing securities 
on those exchanges.205  Although not required to do so by SOX or the 
SRO listing standards, private companies have also been implementing 
corporate governance practices consistent with the Reform.206  There are 
a number of reasons for this phenomenon.  First, many private 
companies are being pushed into compliance by their auditors, their 
 202. See discussion infra Part IV; see also Jones, supra note 9, at 645, 662 (noting a 
trend toward stricter judicial decision-making). 
 203. See Jones, supra note 9, at 662 (noting that a fundamental shift in Delaware 
corporate jurisprudence seems to have occurred). 
 204. See discussion supra Part III.B. 
 205. See id. 
 206. Leisner, supra note 122, § II-8-33 to -34.  According to a study performed by 
the law firm Foley & Lardner LLP, nearly 85% of the participating private companies 
said that they were complying with some aspects of SOX.  Foley & Lardner, THE 
IMPACT OF SARBANES-OXLEY ON PRIVATE & NONPROFIT COMPANIES (2006) available 
at http://www.foley.com/files/tbl_s31Publications/FileUpload/137/3511/ndi%202006%
20private%20study.pdf [hereinafter Foley & Lardner Study].  Very few private 
companies have complied with the requirement to obtain an auditor attestation on their 
internal controls because of the costs associated with compliance.  Id.; see Joseph 
Castelluccio III, Sarbanes-Oxley and Small Business: Section 404 and the Case for a 
Small Business Exemption, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 429, 456-59 (2005) (discussing the 
costly and burdensome effect on small companies of complying with Section 404 of 
SOX); Nathan Wilda, Comment, David Pays for Goliath’s Mistakes: The Costly Effect 
Sarbanes-Oxley Has on Small Companies, 38 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 671, 682-83 (2004) 
(noting the difficulties involved for smaller companies to comply with the internal 
controls requirements); Susan Greco, What They Do in Private (Private Companies 
Adopting Sarbanes-Oxley Act), CORP. COUNS., Sept. 2005, at 24.  As the general 
counsel of Cargill Incorporated, the largest private company in the U.S., aptly noted in 
connection with the auditor attestation requirement under SOX Section 404, private 
companies “continue to have the luxury to be pragmatic.”  Id. 
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lenders, or their public company vendors or customers.207  In addition, 
any private company seeking to go public, or to be acquired by a public 
company, might elect to comply with the Reform in order to appear 
more attractive to investors or potential acquirers.208  But those reasons 
alone do not seem to explain the widespread adoption of Reform-like 
corporate governance practices by private companies.209  As the 
following cases suggest, an impetus for complying with reformed 
corporate governance practices appears to be coming from a shift in 
Delaware jurisprudence as to the parameters of fiduciary duties, and 
how directors satisfy those duties following the Reform.210
A.  Good Faith and the Duties of Care and Loyalty  
Revisited Post-Reform 
1.  Disney 
Following the death of the Walt Disney Company’s president in a 
tragic helicopter crash, Disney Chairman and CEO Michael Eisner 
decided to recruit long-time friend Michael Ovitz, the founder of a 
successful talent agency, for the position.211  Eisner, together with Irwin 
Russell, a director and the chairman of Disney’s compensation 
committee, were eventually able to persuade Ovitz to accept the 
position.212  After negotiating with Ovitz, Eisner and Russell agreed to 
include in Ovitz’s employment agreement a significant no-fault 
termination payment to protect Ovitz in the event that the employment 
 
 207. Greco, supra note 209, at 24. 
 208. Leisner, supra note 122, § II-8-33; Matt Murray, Private Companies Also Feel 
Pressure to Clean Up Acts, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2003, at B1.  In addition, some D&O 
insurance providers are either not providing coverage or are providing more expensive 
coverage to companies which are not SOX-compliant, providing a further impetus to 
comply.  Leisner, supra note 122, § II-8-34. 
 209. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 210. Several commentators have suggested that this shift in Delaware jurisprudence 
is Delaware’s attempt to stave off further federal intervention in the area of corporate 
governance.  See, e.g., Jones, supra note 9, at 626, 633-36; Note, The Case for Federal 
Threats in Corporate Governance, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2726, 2745, 2747 (2005). 
 211. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
113, at *9-18 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d, C.A. No. 15452, 2006 Del. LEXIS 307 (Del. 
2006). 
 212. Id. at *20, 31-47. 
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relationship did not work out.213  Disney retained an executive 
compensation consultant to evaluate the financial terms of Ovitz’s 
employment agreement.214  Raymond Watson, another member of the 
compensation committee, also evaluated those terms.215 When the 
compensation committee members met to discuss the proposed terms of 
Ovitz’s employment agreement, they were given Watson’s analysis on 
the value of the employment agreement as well as a term sheet.216  They 
did not, however, review either a draft of the employment agreement or 
the external consultant’s report.217  The compensation committee 
unanimously approved the terms of the employment agreement at that 
meeting, and the board thereafter unanimously elected Ovitz as 
president.218  Ovitz took over as president on October 1, 1995.219  But 
within a year, it became clear that Ovitz was not a good fit at Disney.220  
At Eisner’s request, Disney’s general counsel reviewed Ovitz’s 
employment agreement and determined that if Disney were to terminate 
Ovitz’s employment, it would constitute a no-fault termination.221  At 
the next executive session of independent directors, Eisner informed the 
directors of his intention to terminate Ovitz’s employment.222  The 
directors were not asked to, nor did they, approve the termination.223  
The no-fault termination payment paid to Ovitz upon his termination 
amounted to $130 million.224
Several Disney stockholders sued the board and Ovitz for breaches 
of their fiduciary duties for entering into the employment agreement 
with Ovitz and terminating that employment without fault.225  The 
Delaware Chancery Court found that the facts, if true, portrayed 
 213. Id. at *20-24. 
 214. Id. at *25-26. 
 215. Id. at *26-27. 
 216. Id. at *39. 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. at *40, 43. 
 219. Id. at *47. 
 220. Id. at *54-55. 
 221. Id. at *99-101. 
 222. Id. at *105. 
 223. Id. at *122-23. 
 224. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), C.A. No. 15452, 2006 Del. 
LEXIS 307, at *3 (Del. 2006). 
 225. Disney I, 731 A.2d at 351, aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Brehm v. 
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000). 
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directors who “consciously and intentionally disregarded their 
responsibilities, adopting a ‘we don’t care about the risks’ attitude 
concerning a material corporate decision.”226  Thus, the facts called into 
question whether the board had acted in good faith, and whether the 
plaintiffs’ failure to make demand on the board was excused.227
The primary question at trial was whether the Disney directors 
breached their duty of care or duty to act in good faith.228  Consistent 
with some recent decisions, but in a break from traditional duty of care 
analyses, the Chancery Court analyzed the plaintiffs’ claims against the 
directors on a director-by-director basis “because the nature of their 
breach of duty (if any), and whether they are exculpated from liability 
for that breach, can vary for each director.”229
The Chancery Court first reviewed the duty of care, repeating the 
standard that in making a business decision, a director must consider all 
material information reasonably available, and will only be found to 
have breached the duty of care where his failure to be informed amounts 
to gross negligence.230  Outside of the context of a board decision, a 
director will be found to have breached his duty of care where a plaintiff 
shows a “lack of good faith as evidenced by [sic] sustained or systematic 
failure of a director to exercise reasonable oversight.”231   
 226. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney II), 825 A.2d 289 (Del. Ch. 
2003). 
 227. Id.  After Disney II, Ovitz moved for summary judgment after discovery, 
arguing that he did not owe the Disney stockholders a fiduciary duty at the time he 
negotiated and entered into his employment agreement, nor at the time he received his 
severance payment.  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney III), 2004 LEXIS 
132, at *2-3 (Del. Ch. 2004).  The Chancery Court agreed that Ovitz was not a fiduciary 
at the time he negotiated his employment agreement.  Id. at *28.  However, the court 
found reasonable doubt as to whether Ovitz had breached his fiduciary duty in obtaining 
the no-fault termination payment and thus did not dismiss that claim.  Id. at *34-35. 
 228. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
113, at *148, aff’d C.A. No. 15452, 2006 Del. LEXIS 307 (Del. 2006).  The duty of 
loyalty claim only pertained to Ovitz and the court resolved that claim by determining 
that Ovitz did not play any part in the decision to fire himself or to pay himself the no-
fault termination payment.  Id. at *183.  The court also dismissed the waste claim as it 
found that the record did not support a finding of waste given the high hurdle needed to 
show waste.  Id. at *186-89. 
 229. Id. at *154 (citing In re Emerging Communications Inc. S’holders Litig., 2004 
Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, 2004 WL 1305745, at *38 (Del. Ch. 2004)). 
 230. Id. at *158-63. 
 231. Id. at *161 (citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 971). 
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Next, the court analyzed the duty of good faith.  The Chancery 
Court acknowledged that Delaware court decisions have not been 
entirely clear or consistent as to whether a separate duty of good faith 
exists, or in fact what good faith means.232  In the Chancery Court’s 
view, good faith mandates not only compliance with a director’s duties 
of care and loyalty, but also that she act with an honesty of purpose.233  
According to the court, one standard of bad faith is the “intentional 
dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard for one’s responsibilities.”234  
An action taken with intent to harm a corporation, such as authorizing a 
transaction either for some purpose other than a genuine attempt to 
advance corporate welfare, or one violating the law, also amounts to bad 
faith.235  But the court noted that these are not the only definitions of bad 
faith.236
Based on the facts presented, the Chancery Court found that none 
of the Disney directors breached their duty of care or duty to act in good 
faith.  Specifically, the court found that each of the board members was 
informed as to all material information reasonably available in hiring 
Ovitz.237  The court noted that the board’s conduct fell short of best 
practices, particularly Eisner’s failure to keep the full board informed 
during the hiring process.238  But in the court’s view, these deficiencies 
did not amount to gross negligence, nor were they taken with intent to 
harm Disney or with an intentional and conscious disregard of duty.239 
Further, the compensation committee members did not breach their 
duties of care or good faith in negotiating and approving Ovitz’s 
compensation package.240  While the court acknowledged that the lack 
of involvement of some committee members hearkens back to the lapses 
seen in Van Gorkom, the court distinguished the board’s decision as to 
executive compensation in Disney from the “monumental” decision in 
Van Gorkom to sell a company.241  With respect to the fiduciary duty 
 232. Id. at *169. 
 233. Id. at *169-70. 
 234. Id. at *175 (italics in original). 
 235. Id. at *169-70. 
 236. Id. at *175. 
 237. Id. at *198, 227. 
 238. Id. at *198-99. 
 239. Id. at *200. 
 240. Id. at *205-24. 
 241. Id. at *212.  The Chancery Court also distinguished Disney on other grounds, 
including the fact that board approval is not required under the DGCL for the retention 
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claims relating to the termination of Ovitz, the Chancery Court found 
that Eisner had the power to remove inferior officers and employees 
under Disney’s organizational documents and related board 
authorization.242  Thus, no board action was required to terminate Ovitz, 
and no fiduciary duty was breached as a result of that action.243
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed the Chancery Court’s 
ruling.244  Further crystallizing what amounts to bad faith, and consistent 
with the lower court’s decision, the court ruled that “subjective bad 
faith,” or conduct motivated by an actual intent to do harm, can 
constitute bad faith.245  The court stated that this construction is “so well 
accepted in the liturgy of fiduciary law that it borders on axiomatic.”246  
Another category of bad faith “involves” the lack of due care, or gross 
negligence.247  However, gross negligence alone does not constitute bad 
faith.248  The court explained the distinction between gross negligence 
and bad faith by way of example.249  Specifically, where a director has 
subjective hostility to a corporation on whose board he serves and thus 
fails to inform himself or to devote sufficient attention to matters as to 
which he is making a decision, the subjective hostility would lead to a 
and compensation of officers whereas it is required to approve a merger, and the fact 
that the compensation committee members were aware of Ovitz’s hiring before their 
meeting, were in support of his hiring and received written material at the meeting as to 
Ovitz’s employment agreement, whereas in Van Gorkom, the directors did not know 
anything about the merger prior to their  board meeting, were not generally in favor of 
the merger and did not receive any written material or reports evaluating the merger 
price.  Id. at *212-14. 
 242. Id. at *232-33. 
 243. Id. at *232-35. 
 244. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney V), C.A. No. 15452, 2006 Del. 
LEXIS 307, at *126 (Del. 2006). 
 245. Id. at *93. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at *94.  This type of bad faith is referred to herein as “gross negligence 
plus” because it requires a showing of gross negligence plus some evidence of a bad 
intent, though it is not clear how bad this bad intent must be, or how it is to be 
established. 
 248. Id. at *94-95.  The Delaware Supreme Court referred to Sections 102(b)(7) and 
145 of the DGCL, which disallow exculpation and indemnification, respectively, of 
directors for actions not taken in good faith, to evidence the Delaware General 
Assembly’s intent to distinguish the duty of care from the duty of good faith.  Id. at 
*96-98. 
 249. Id. at *95. 
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finding of bad faith, while the gross negligence would lead to a finding 
of the breach of the duty of care.250  According to the court, this 
formulation of bad faith is intended to capture conduct not involving 
classic disloyalty, but that is qualitatively more culpable than gross 
negligence.251  Parroting words from Chancellor Chandler, the court 
indicated that other definitions of bad faith may exist.252
Disney, (referring collectively to Disney IV and Disney V), seems to 
reflect a shift in Delaware jurisprudence regarding fiduciary duties.253  
Prior to Disney, Delaware courts did not typically undertake a separate 
analysis as to whether directors acted in good faith, suggesting that good 
faith is assuming independent significance in the fiduciary duty 
context.254  The Disney courts’ focus on good faith is significant not 
 250. Id. 
 251. Id. at *100. 
 252. Id. at *102-03. 
 253. The shift appears to have taken place between the time that Disney I was 
decided, in 1998, and the time that Disney II was decided, in 2003, given the Chancery 
Court’s about-face in determining demand futility.  The difference in outcomes seems 
to reflect the shift in Delaware jurisprudence following enactment of the Reform and 
stockholders’ calls for increased board accountability.  See Janssen, supra note 25, at 
1598-99 (theorizing that the difference in opinions between Disney I and Disney II 
reflected a change in the corporate climate following the corporate scandals and 
pressure on courts and legislators to make directors more accountable); see Jones, supra 
note 9, at 656-57 (arguing that despite the presentation of the same factual pattern, the 
Delaware Chancery Court in Disney I used a deferential approach to evaluating board 
conduct while in Disney II the court harshly criticized the Disney directors for their 
conduct).  Admittedly the facts might not have been sufficiently pled in Disney I to 
excuse demand, but in no instance did the Chancery Court in Disney I cite any 
shortcoming of the Disney board, while in Disney II it failed to see how the board 
“exercised any business judgment.”  See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. 
(Disney II), 825 A.2d 275, 277 (Del. Ch. 2003) (denying the defendant directors’ 
motion to dismiss and noting that plaintiffs’ new complaint suggests that the Disney 
directors “failed to make any good faith attempt to fulfill their fiduciary duties); In re 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney I), 731 A.2d 342, 380 (Del. Ch. 1998) 
(dismissing the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to show why demand was futile); but 
see Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 249 (Del. 2000) (noting that the facts of the case 
were “very troubling” and allowing the plaintiffs to amend their complaint). 
 254. See Hillary A. Sale, Delaware’s Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 471 
(2004) (noting that the Delaware courts’ decisions in Disney have moved good faith 
towards a separate duty); Norman E. Veasey, Access to Justice: The Social 
Responsibility of Lawyers: Reflections on Key Issues of the Professional 
Responsibilities of Corporate Lawyers in the Twenty-First Century, Remarks at the 
Annual Tyrrell Williams Lecture at the Washington University School of Law), 12 
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only because the failure to act in good faith affords courts an avenue to 
potentially impose liability not exculpated under Section 102(b)(7) of 
the DGCL, but it also could impose liability for which directors might 
not be insured.255
Members of the Delaware judiciary predicted—or perhaps more 
appropriately, warned—that the Delaware courts would be willing to use 
the notion of good faith as a way to respond to stockholder calls for 
post-Reform enforcement of enhanced director duties.256  As suggested 
WASH U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 9 (2003) [hereinafter Veasey, Access to Justice] (“As far as 
the Delaware case law is concerned, however, the jurisprudence on good faith is 
unresolved.  Therefore, I express no opinion on whether a separate duty of good faith 
that is not subsumed within the duty of loyalty should apply upon court review . . . .”); 
see also discussion supra Part II.D. 
 255. Jeffrey D. Hern, Delaware Courts’ Delicate Response to the Corporate 
Governance Scandals of 2001 and 2002: Heightened Judicial Scrutiny on Directors of 
Corporations, 41 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 207, 220-21 (2005) (suggesting that Disney 
evidences a heightening of judicial scrutiny on directors and a toughening of corporate 
governance standards in Delaware).  D&O liability insurance policies generally do not 
provide coverage for deliberate fraud or personal profit or advantage obtained 
wrongfully.  Black, supra note 3, at 1086.  While not all bad faith would fit within these 
policy exclusions, because bad faith is considered indirectly a breach of the duty of 
loyalty, presumably insurers will use a breach of the duty of loyalty to show that an 
improper personal benefit was obtained and deny coverage. 
 256. Strine, supra note 33, at 1393 (noting how plaintiffs’ lawyers might approach 
“duty to monitor” cases after Enron); Veasey, Access to Justice, supra note 254, at 13 
(“Today, the utter failure of directors to follow the minimum expectations of the 
standards of directors conduct, Sarbanes-Oxley, or the NYSE or NASDAQ Rules, 
might likewise raise a good faith issue.”); see also Johnson & Sides, supra note 6, at 
1152 (predicting that the duty of good faith will likely be a doctrinal vessel for injecting 
certain mandates of SOX into state fiduciary duty law).  It is not surprising that the 
Delaware courts decided to reveal the new direction of the courts in the executive 
compensation context, given the absence at that time of any measure to curb executive 
compensation in the Reform, and the role options are thought to have played in bringing 
about accounting fraud.  See supra notes 128-31 and accompanying text.  In August of 
2006, the Commission passed rules requiring significant new disclosure as to executive 
compensation in an easier-to-understand format.  Executive Compensation and Related 
Person Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. pts. 228, 229, 232, 239, 240, 245, 249 and 274 (2006), 
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/2006/33-8732a.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 
2007).  In its adopting release, the Commission emphasized the association between 
compensation and relationships with the issuer, as transactions often involve 
compensation-like features.  Id.  Thus the disclosure is aimed at providing investors 
with information about potentially independence-compromising compensation 
arrangements.  Id. 
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by Vice Chancellors Chandler and Strine, the Delaware courts appear to 
have become more receptive to stockholder arguments for increased 
accountability to enforce responsibilities under the Reform, seen largely 
as an effort to align state law with federal law.257  That Delaware courts 
will, on some level, implement the Reform’s call for increased director 
oversight is fortunate for stockholders, who presumably will seek to 
enforce duties imposed under the Reform through state fiduciary duty 
law, due to the absence of an enforcement avenue through the federal 
courts.258  In that way, even though federal securities law and Delaware 
law take contrasting approaches to regulating director conduct (the 
former regulating by proscriptive rules and the latter regulating by 
enabling standards) both seem to reflect the evolving environment of 
enhanced directors’ oversight duties and increased accountability.259  
2.   Stone 
Following Disney, it was not entirely clear whether there was a 
separate fiduciary duty of good faith, though it was evident both that the 
Delaware courts were placing a new emphasis on the obligation of a 
director to act in good faith, and that liability could flow from failing to 
act in good faith.  One of the possible implications of there being a 
separate duty of good faith is that it could create a basis for director 
liability beyond the traditional bounds of the duties of care and loyalty.  
However, in Stone v. Ritter260 it became clear that good faith was not a 
separate fiduciary duty, but rather a component of the duty of loyalty. 
In Stone, AmSouth Bancorporation paid $50 million in fines and 
penalties as a result of a number of failures by bank employees to file 
Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) with a bureau of the U.S. 
Department of Treasury.261  Under federal bank secrecy and anti-
 
 257. Chandler & Strine, supra note 21, at 983-84; see also Veasey, Access to 
Justice, supra note 254, at 9 (“[G]ood faith is likely to emerge as a central issue of the 
directors’ standard of conduct.”); but see id. (“It [good faith] may or may not emerge as 
a standard of liability, however.”). 
 258. See discussion supra Title III.D. 
 259. Janssen, supra note 25, at 1598-1600 (noting that the corporate scandals put 
pressure on courts and legislators to make directors more accountable, and that the duty 
of good faith was the Delaware courts’ only option for increasing judicial oversight of 
directors and ward off further federal encroachment). 
 260. 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2005). 
 261. Id. at 365. 
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money-laundering laws, SARs must be filed where a bank knows or has 
reason to suspect that a banking transaction involves funds derived from 
illegal activities.262  Several stockholders of AmSouth filed a derivative 
suit against AmSouth’s directors, alleging that the directors breached 
their fiduciary duties by failing to institute sufficient internal controls to 
prevent violations of bank secrecy and anti-money-laundering laws.263  
The Delaware Chancery Court granted the defendant directors’ motion 
to dismiss for failure to make demand on the board,264 and the Delaware 
Supreme Court affirmed.265  Applying the second prong of the Rales test 
for when demand is excused outside of the context of a business 
decision, the court analyzed whether the complaint created a reasonable 
doubt that the board could have properly exercised its independent and 
disinterested business judgment in responding to demand.266  That, in 
turn, depends on whether the directors face a substantial likelihood of 
liability for which they would not be exculpated under Section 102(b)(7) 
of the DGCL.267  Because the plaintiffs did not allege a breach of the 
duty of loyalty, the court analyzed whether the directors had acted in bad 
faith, which also precludes exculpation under Section 102(b)(7).268
The Delaware Supreme Court validated the definition of bad faith 
in the oversight context set forth in Caremark, which defined bad faith 
as a “sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight-
such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and 
reporting system exists . . . .”269  According to the court, this definition 
is consistent with the Disney definition of bad faith as a conscious 
disregard for duties.270  Thus a conscious failure to monitor or oversee 
the operation of a reporting or information system would amount to bad 
faith.271  However, the failure to act in good faith does not ipso facto 
result in fiduciary liability.272  Rather, bad faith is a “condition” of the 
 262. Id. at 365 n.4. 
 263. Stone v. Ritter, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 146, at *1 (Del. Ch. 2006). 
 264. Id. at *8. 
 265. Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d at 373. 
 266. Id. at 367. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 369 (citing In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d at 971). 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. at 370. 
 272. Id. at 369. 
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duty of loyalty which “may” lead to a breach of the duty of loyalty.273  
Thus according to the court, there is no separate duty of good faith, but 
rather a good faith component to the duty of loyalty which, if not 
satisfied, may lead to a breach of the duty of loyalty.  Based on the facts, 
including a report prepared by an independent consultant which found 
that AmSouth’s board had at various times enacted written policies and 
procedures designed to ensure compliance with bank secrecy and anti-
money-laundering laws, the court held that the plaintiffs had not created 
a reasonable doubt as to whether the directors acted in good faith.274
Even following Disney and Stone, the path to enforcement of the 
duty of loyalty through the failure to act in good faith is not entirely 
clear, in part due to the paucity of case law on good faith as a component 
of the duty of loyalty, and in part because of the suggestion by the courts 
in Disney that definitions of bad faith other than those that have been 
enumerated might exist.275  The difficulty in knowing what amounts to 
bad faith is compounded by the Delaware Supreme Court’s statement 
that although fiduciary duties do not change over time, “how we 
understand those duties may evolve and become refined.”276  How we 
understand fiduciary duties indeed appears to be shifting, evidenced by 
the careful scrutiny given to the process employed by the Disney 
compensation committee in making an ordinary business decision that, 
before Disney, seemed to have been presumed a valid exercise of 
business judgment.  Just as a defined word takes on a new or altered 
meaning to reflect societal and linguistic changes, so too do fiduciary 
duties morph as stockholders’ and courts’ expectations and demands 
change with the currents of business and policy.277
 273. Id. at 369-70. 
 274. Id. at 373. 
 275. See supra note 252; but see Janssen supra note 25 at 1608-09 (noting that the 
court in Disney V focused on board procedure rather than on the irrationality of a board 
decision in defining good faith, thus making it a weak duty). 
 276. In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig. (Disney IV), 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 
113, at *4, aff’d C.A. No. 15452, 2006 Del. LEXIS 307 (Del. 2006).  As former Chief 
Justice Veasey has indicated, “In my view, what we are seeing as our jurisprudence 
develops are the ‘evolving expectations of directors.’”  Veasey, Counseling Directors, 
supra note 141, at 1450; but see Janssen, supra note 25, at 1602 (noting, after Disney IV 
was decided, that Disney IV greatly restricted the duty of good faith and thereby limited 
the ability of Delaware courts to apply the duty of good faith to enhance director 
accountability). 
 277. See Janssen, supra note 25, at 1598-1600; see also supra note 269 and 
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In addition to the evolution of fiduciary duties reflecting changing 
expectations, fiduciary duties change where “fulfilling a fiduciary duty 
requires obedience to other positive law.”278  This is important in the 
wake of the Reform, as audit committee directors have a number of new 
responsibilities under SOX aimed at making them more involved in 
overseeing management accounting practices, the audit itself and 
compliance with law.279
Disney and Stone are significant in an environment following recent 
lapses in board oversight that led to corporate collapses on a grand scale, 
where directors’ performance of their monitoring function has been 
placed under a microscope.  Disney suggests that a court might closely 
scrutinize an ordinary business decision to determine whether lapses in 
the decision-making process amounted to a conscious disregard for 
responsibilities, “gross negligence plus” or some other as-of-yet 
undefined form of bad faith.  With oversight responsibilities imposed by 
the Reform, and as a result of the broad standardization of Reform-like 
governance practices, directors will undoubtedly face an increased 
number of ordinary business decisions requiring them to take into 
account all information reasonably available to them, using a process 
indicating good faith. 
 
Stone, on the other hand, demonstrates how courts might implement 
the Reform’s enhanced internal control system requirements through 
fiduciary duty law,280 as the court makes clear that internal controls are 
accompanying text. 
 278. Disney IV, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *4. 
 279. See Hamilton & Rasmussen, supra note 149, at 13 (discussing the impact of 
Section 404 of SOX on audit committees); Leisner, supra note 122, § I-144 to -54 
(discussing all of the new responsibilities of audit committee members under SOX); see 
also discussion supra Part III.C. 
 280. See Chandler, et al., supra note 21, at 987.  (“[T]he gravitational effect of the 
Reform’s existence will nudge state judges to align their own state corporate systems to 
avoid whipsawing corporate directors with incompatible dictates.”); Strine, supra note 
33, at 1385; see also supra note 256 and accompanying text.  According to former 
Chief Justice Veasey:   
I would note, also as a matter of prudent counseling, that boards should be told that it 
is arguable—but not settled—that their conduct may be measured not only by the 
evolving expectations of directors in the context of Delaware common law fiduciary 
duty, but also it may well be measured against the backdrop of relevant Sarbanes-
Oxley SEC Rules and the SRO requirements, even though there may be no express 
private right of action in the federal legislation.  That is, when and if these reforms are 
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part of the information and reporting systems that directors must assure 
exist under Caremark.281  It also instructs plaintiffs how to make a case 
against directors in relation to their deficient implementation or 
oversight of internal controls.  This is consistent with the message 
conveyed by Vice Chancellor Strine: 
Enron will also generate increased pressure on courts to examine 
carefully the plausibility of directors’ claims that they were able to 
devote sufficient time to their duties to have carried them out in good 
faith . . . .  Enron and situations like it suggest to me that skillful 
plaintiffs’ lawyers will begin making common-sense arguments 
about the disconnect between the routine tasks directors undertook to 
perform and the effort they put in to accomplish them.282
Private companies have also been putting enhanced information and 
reporting systems in place, suggesting that these systems are becoming 
the norm.283  In the context of public companies, stockholders are unable 
to enforce the implementation of Reform-compliant internal control 
systems under federal securities laws.  This may lead to further attempts 
to enforce those internal control requirements under state fiduciary duty 
law, using arguments similar to those made in Stone. 
Enhanced information and reporting systems seem to lead to an 
enhanced duty of oversight, not only as part of an obligation to oversee 
implementation and functioning of those internal control systems, but 
also due to the need to use the information generated by those systems in 
the discharge of duties.284  For instance, deficiencies in internal controls 
presented as part of a board’s conduct in a Delaware court where the conduct is 
relevant, adherence to these reforms may be relevant and would be advisable as a 
matter of state fiduciary duty principles. 
Veasey, Counseling Directors, supra note 141, at 1453. 
 281. See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d at 370. 
 282. Strine, supra note 33, at 1385 (italics in original). 
 283. Foley & Lardner Study, supra note 206 (finding that close to 70% of the 
responding private companies indicated that they had, or intended to, increase the 
internal audit function, and close to 60% indicated that they had or intended to have an 
outside audit of internal financial controls); see Johnson et al., supra note 6, at 1216 
(arguing that SOX might impose a federal mandate of adopting reasonable controls as a 
state standard, since this appears to be consistent with Caremark). 
 284. See Fairfax, supra note 8, at 401-02 (arguing that SOX requires audit 
committee members to remain informed about accounting and financial processes and 
to ask probing questions about those processes and to be involved with internal 
investigations arising from information and reporting systems); Johnson, supra note 6, 
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may keep the audit committee from receiving the information it needs—
and is expected to have—in monitoring firm performance.  As a result, 
the audit committee might not be able to oversee the accounting and 
financial reporting processes effectively, a responsibility it is charged 
with.285  Disney and Stone do not provide an exclusive list of actions that 
amount to bad faith.  Thus, the audit committee might face accusations 
that its failure to consider information not reported to it due to 
information and reporting system deficiencies prevented it from acting 
in the best interests of stockholders.  The fact that public companies are 
required to disclose any internal control deficiencies might give 
plaintiffs the ace in establishing this type of fiduciary duty claim. 
On the heels of the Reform’s change to the corporate governance 
framework, the U.S. sentencing commission amended the organizational 
sentencing guidelines for the first time, strengthening the criteria for an 
effective compliance program.286  Under the amended guidelines, courts 
can consider the fact that directors and officers oversaw the operation of 
a compliance and ethics program a mitigating factor in determining the 
punishment for an organization found to have engaged in criminal 
conduct.287  The U.S. sentencing commission’s inclusion of ethics in the 
compliance program is new; previous guidelines only contemplated 
programs to detect and prevent violations of law.288  As former 
Chancellor Allen noted in reference to organizational sentencing 
guidelines in Caremark, “[a]ny rational person attempting in good faith 
to meet an organizational governance responsibility would be bound to 
take into account this development and the enhanced penalties and the 
at 36 (“What it means to be reasonably informed is different in corporate law today—
after Sarbanes-Oxley—than in 1996 [the year of the Caremark decision] . . . .”). 
 285. See Strine, supra note 33, at 1393, noting: 
One can see how plaintiffs’ lawyers might approach “duty to monitor” cases 
differently in the near future.  They might well ask courts to infer not only that the 
audit committee members did not know enough about their company’s financial and 
accounting practices, but also that the committee members knew that their inadequate 
knowledge disabled them from discharging their responsibilities with fidelity. 
Id. 
 286. See News Release, U.S. Sentencing Commission, Commission Tightens 
Requirements for Corporate Compliance and Ethics Programs (May 3, 2004), 
available at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel0504.htm. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. 
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opportunities for reduced sanctions that it offers.”289  In heeding former 
Chancellor Allen’s remarks, a board may need to implement a corporate 
compliance and ethics program to comply with its fiduciary duty of 
oversight in good faith.290  Here, again, the federal mandate can be 
heard: corporate players must play by the rules and be upstanding to 
boot. 
3.  Emerging Communications 
While the Delaware courts upheld the compensation committee’s 
reliance on a report prepared by Disney’s compensation consultant, the 
Delaware Chancery Court in another post-Reform decision found that 
one of the directors was not so entitled to rely.291  In In re Emerging 
Communications Inc. Shareholders Litigation, Jeffrey Prosser owned all 
shares of Innovative Communications, which in turn owned a majority 
of the shares in Emerging Communications.292  Prosser proposed 
privatizing Emerging Communications by having all of its publicly 
owned shares acquired by Innovative Communications and then merging 
the two companies.293  A special committee of Emerging 
Communications directors approved the two-step transaction at the price 
proposed by Innovative Communications in reliance on a fairness 
opinion from Emerging Communications’ financial advisor stating that 
the price was fair to the minority stockholders.294  The financial 
advisor’s opinion, however, was based on stale financial projections.295  
Updated financial projections, projections Prosser had not furnished to 
the financial advisor, reflected the intrinsic value of Emerging 
Communications and indicated substantial growth in its business.296  
The stockholders, who had also not been provided with the current 
 
 289. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig, 698 A.2d 951, 970 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 290. But see Brown, supra note 1, at 345 (arguing that the standard employed in 
Caremark meant that directors would almost never be liable for a failure to monitor as a 
result of inadequate compliance procedures). 
 291. In re Emerging Commc’ns Inc. S’holders Litig., C.A. No. 16415, 2004 Del. 
Ch. LEXIS 70, at *143-47 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 292. Id. at *6. 
 293. Id. at *2-3. 
 294. Id. at *33-34. 
 295. Id. at *25, 27. 
 296. Id. 
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financial projections, voted to approve the merger.297
After the transaction closed, the minority stockholders sued 
Emerging Communications’ directors, claiming that the members of the 
special committee breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and good 
faith by approving the transaction.298  As in Disney, the Chancery Court 
performed a director-by-director analysis to determine whether any of 
the directors had breached their fiduciary duties.299  One director, 
Salvatore Muoio, was a principal of an investment-advising firm, and 
had significant experience in telecommunications-sector financial 
matters.300  The Chancery Court determined that, because of Muoio’s 
experience, he knew, or should have known, the intrinsic value of 
Emerging Communications, and that the merger price was unfair.301  
Thus the court determined that Muoio was not able, in good faith, to rely 
on the financial consultant’s fairness opinion in establishing his exercise 
of business judgment.302  The court further reasoned that because Muoio 
approved the transaction, he either did so to advance his own self-
interest or had consciously and intentionally disregarded his 
responsibilities; in either case, amounting to a breach of the duty of 
loyalty or an act of bad faith.303  The court criticized Muoio for not 
advocating to the board to reject the price offered, or go on record as 
rejecting the price, as his expertise should have led him to conclude that 
the proposed merger price was not fair.304
The Reform calls for increased financial expertise on the audit 
committee.305 Presumably reflecting what has become a standard 
practice, private companies have also been including directors with 
financial expertise on their boards.306  Under Commission rules, being 
 297. Id. at *34-35, *132-34. 
 298. Id. at *35-36. 
 299. Id. at *140. 
 300. Id. at *143. 
 301. Id. at *143-44. 
 302. Id. at *144-45.  The Chancery Court presumably determined that Muoio could 
not rely on the opinion under Section 141(e) of the DGCL.  Id. 
 303. Id. at *145-47.  The court did not distinguish the duty of loyalty from the duty 
of good faith.  Id. 
 304. Id. at *144. 
 305. See supra Part III.C. 
 306. See Foley & Lardner Study, supra note 206 (finding that close to 70% of the 
responding private companies added or intended to add a financial expert on the audit 
committee following the Reform). 
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labeled an audit committee financial expert does not expose that director 
to liability as an expert under federal securities laws.307  However, as 
Emerging Communications reveals, a director with financial expertise 
might not be justified in relying on a financial advisor’s report or 
opinion under Section 141(e) of the DGCL to establish his business 
judgment if his own expertise should have caused him to question that 
report or opinion.308  This also pertains to a director’s ability to rely on 
information furnished by, or a statement made by, an officer where the 
director has reason to doubt that information or statement.309  In 
Emerging Communications, the court did not focus on what Muoio 
actually knew, but looked to what he should have known based on his 
training and experience, in determining how Muoio’s conduct fell short.  
In this way, training and experience seem to raise the expected level of 
conduct for directors, regardless of personal competence.310  This might 
impose an obligation, at least on accounting and financial experts, to 
keep apprised of developments in the accounting industry at the risk of 
falling below the standard of conduct a court expects from directors with 
such experience and training.  In this way, a director’s specialized 
knowledge and background, sought and encouraged under the Reform, 
may impose additional responsibilities on that director and expose him 
to potential liability in the fiduciary duty context.311
B.  Director Independence Post-Reform 
1.  Duty of Loyalty 
The shift in fiduciary duties post-Reform is also apparent in the 
analysis of director independence.  The best way to demonstrate this 
 
 307. Section 407 Release, supra note 171, § II.A.5. 
 308. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of 
Corporate Governance?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1189, 1199 (2003) (predicting that the audit 
committee financial expert’s increased access to information will heighten his legal 
responsibilities despite assurances from the Commission). 
 309. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 310. Johnson, supra note 6, at 33 (“A director with special accounting skills or 
training may not be warranted in relying in a situation where an untrained director 
might be warranted in relying.  Likewise, one or more directors with information 
unknown to other directors may not be able to rely as broadly as other directors.”). 
 311. Id. at 51 (noting that a director with special skills, background or expertise may 
have greater responsibility whether or not he is designated as an expert). 
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shift, initially in the duty of loyalty context, is by way of example. 
FSC, a sulfur company, and MOXY, an oil and gas exploration 
company, were sister corporations spun off from the same company.312  
In 1998, the boards of both FMS and MOXY decided that the two 
siblings would benefit from being reunited, and so considered merging 
the two.313  Each corporation formed a special committee to negotiate 
the terms of the merger.314  After some negotiations, the two special 
committees arrived at an agreement as to the terms of the merger.315  
Each committee then submitted the merger proposal to, and received 
approval from, its respective board.316  The stockholders of both 
companies subsequently approved the merger.317  After consummation 
of the merger, the stockholders of FSC sued the former FSC directors, 
alleging that they had breached their fiduciary duties by approving the 
merger with MOXY.318
According to the plaintiffs, the five former FSC directors not on the 
special committee were interested in the transaction with MOXY.319  
Thus, the board’s approval of the merger did not cleanse the transaction 
under Section 144(a) of the DGCL, and the board was not entitled to the 
protection of the business judgment rule.320  The lower court found that 
the pleadings called into question whether a majority of the directors 
was interested.321  But the defendant directors’ motion to dismiss was 
granted because the complaint did not establish that those interests 
“impugned” the special committee’s deliberations or negotiations.322  On 
appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court reversed.323  According to the 
 312. Krasner v. Moffett, 826 A.2d 277, 279 (Del. 2003). 
 313. Id. at 279-80. 
 314. Id. at 280. 
 315. Id. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. at 281. 
 318. Id.  The court did not clearly specify which fiduciary duties were allegedly 
breached by the directors, but in its analysis it focused on whether the defendant 
directors had disabling conflicts and whether those interests were cleansed by approval 
of the special committee, thus implying that the key claim was a breach of the duty of 
loyalty. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. at 282. 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 289. 
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court, the plaintiffs were entitled, at the pleading stage, to the inference 
that a majority of the directors was not independent or disinterested.324  
The defendant directors had the burden of proving that the merger was 
approved by a committee of disinterested directors, acting 
independently, with real bargaining power to negotiate the terms of the 
merger.325  Because they did not meet this burden, their motion to 
dismiss was denied.326
By placing the burden of proving independence on the directors, the 
Delaware Supreme Court has indicated that independence is not 
presumed, and must be affirmatively established.327  Plaintiffs then have 
the opportunity to discredit that evidence, not only by revealing ties 
between an interested party and special committee members, but also, a 
la Krasner, by showing how the mere presence of an interested party in 
the board approval process impugned that process.   
The Delaware courts seem to have become more sensitive to the 
potential for bias associated with an interested party transaction, 
particularly in the current climate of skepticism towards directors.  
Consequently, in a cleansing board approval setting, directors would be 
wise to consider factors that might compromise independent approval up 
front, or risk having a court decide after the fact that the approval 
process did not remove the interested party taint, thereby giving the 
court the opportunity to review the substance of the transaction for 
fairness.328  It is in this way that an independence inquiry might unlock a 
duty of loyalty case for a plaintiff. 
In the context of an interested party transaction, raising the bar on 
independence is consistent with the Reform’s policy of eliminating 
competing personal interests.329  It may also reflect the Delaware courts’ 
increased skepticism as to the cleansing power of the independent 
 324. Id. at 284. 
 325. Id. at 284-85. 
 326. Id. at 286. 
 327. Jones, supra note 9, at 657-59. 
 328. Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 21 (Del. Ch. 2002) (quoting Kahn v. Lynch 
Comm. Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1115 (Del. 1994)) (noting that a determination that 
entire fairness is the appropriate standard of review is of critical importance to a case 
and normally will preclude dismissal of a complaint on a motion to dismiss). 
 329. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 134, at Title III.A. (opining that many recent 
failures have been attributed to close ties between audit committee members and 
management); Campos, supra note 164, at 529; see also supra note 164 and 
accompanying text. 
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director approval process.330  As Vice Chancellor Strine has indicated, a 
stockholder vote based on full information creates a greater appearance 
of fairness than independent director approval because the stockholders 
have the chance to protect themselves, and are not forced to rely on the 
skills and integrity of the board.331  Perhaps stockholder solicitation will 
become a more attractive option in Delaware as increasing difficulty in 
establishing a valid cleansing board approval under Section 144(a) of the 
DGCL could lead to more proceedings beyond the motion to dismiss 
phase.332
Still, Vice Chancellors Chandler and Strine have been careful to 
note that failing to satisfy the heightened independence inquiry does not 
determine whether a conflict of interest, for which an interested director 
may be liable, exists.333  But if that interest prevents a director from 
being impartial, it may be relevant to a court determining whether a 
director acted with the necessary state of mind for a breach of the duty 
of loyalty, such as bad faith.334  
2.  Demand Futility and the SLC 
Independence again comes into play where a stockholder has 
commenced a derivative suit and alleges that demand is futile, due to the 
fact that either the directors are not disinterested or independent, or that 
the challenged transaction was not the product of a valid exercise of 
business judgment.335  A director has traditionally not been viewed as 
independent in this context if her decision is based on extraneous 
 
 330. Strine, supra note 33, at 1399 (“The parade of Enron executives and directors 
who went before the Congress to plead guilty to ignorance about key financial issues is 
arguably difficult to reconcile with the ideal of paternalistic and all-knowing directors 
acting as the faithful market intermediaries for the stockholders.”). 
 331. Id. at 1401.  But cf. Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 456, with Eisenberg, supra note 
4, at 456 (making the counterpoint that it is hard to be confident that stockholders who 
are sent proxy statements that include a proposal for their consideration will study and 
fully understand the relevant issues). 
 332. The NASD rules require that all related party transactions be approved by the 
listed company’s audit committee or comparable body.  See NASDAQ Manual, supra 
note 152, § 4350(h).  Thus, a stockholder ratification would not cleanse an interested 
party transaction. 
 333. Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 998. 
 334. See id. 
 335. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984). 
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considerations rather than the corporate merits of the matter before the 
board.336  Delaware courts have generally focused on whether a director 
is dominated or controlled by an interested party when determining if 
her decision was based on extraneous considerations.337
The Delaware Chancery Court recently confirmed the notion that a 
director’s consideration of extraneous considerations shows a lack of 
independence in Beam ex rel Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. 
Stewart.338  In Beam, a stockholder of Martha Stewart Living 
Omnimedia (MSLO) alleged that Martha Stewart breached her fiduciary 
duties to MSLO by selling shares of ImClone and making public 
statements detrimental to MSLO regarding the sale.339  The stockholder 
did not make demand on the board of MSLO, arguing that demand 
would have been futile.340  The Chancery Court easily determined that 
Stewart was not independent for purposes of demand futility, as she was 
the subject of the litigation giving rise to the demand requirement.341  
The court also determined that MSLO’s chief operating officer, also on 
the board, was not independent because Stewart was MSLO’s senior 
executive, and thus had the ability to affect her employment and 
compensation.342  The court then turned to the outside directors; the fact 
that Stewart controlled 94% of MSLO, and had the power to elect and 
remove directors, was not dispositive of those directors’ 
independence.343  Instead, the court considered whether remaining on 
the board of MSLO was material to each outside director, such that each 
director was unable to consider demand without factoring in this 
extraneous consideration.344  The Chancery Court ruled that the 
plaintiff’s complaint did not establish a lack of director independence, as 
it failed to present evidence that any of the outside directors had 
 336. Id. at 815. 
 337. Id. 
 338. Beam ex rel Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 833 A.2d 961, 
977 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 339. Id. at 977. 
 340. Id. at 976.  The Chancery Court applied the Rales test for demand futility 
because the challenged action was the sale by Stewart of her shares in ImClone and her 
associated public statements—it was not based on a decision by the board of MSLO.  
Id. at 977 (citing Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927 (Del. 1993)). 
 341. Id. at 977. 
 342. Id. at 977-78. 
 343. Id. at 978. 
 344. Id. 
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previously followed Stewart’s will or recommendations without 
independent investigation.345  The court acknowledged that some 
professional or personal friendships may raise reasonable doubt as to 
director independence,346 but the pleadings in this case did not create 
that doubt as to any of the outside directors.347
While not performing a detailed analysis of the MSLO board’s 
independence in Beam, presumably due to a lack of facts in the 
pleadings to enable this analysis, the court did not focus solely on 
notions of domination and control in its analysis, the traditional focus of 
the independence inquiry in the demand futility context.348  
Nevertheless, this case seems to illustrate the consequence of deficient 
pleadings, rather than serving as a guide as to independence.  
Admittedly, the Chancery Court gave substantial weight to its seemingly 
sua sponte determination that the reputations of two directors prevented 
them from making a decision that gave undue consideration to their 
relationships with Stewart.  But again, that determination may have 
resulted from deficient pleadings, leaving the Chancery Court to make 
logical leaps as to the various factors affecting independence.  At a 
minimum, Beam does suggest that in determining demand futility, the 
Delaware courts may be shifting the independence inquiry from a 
question of control to a more contextual inquiry, as seen in the duty of 
loyalty context. 
The Delaware courts have given clearer guidance on the nature of 
independence in the derivative suit context, where an action has been 
commenced, and a board has formed a SLC to decide whether to dismiss 
 345. Id. at 978-79. 
 346. Id. at 979. 
 347. Id. at 979-81.  The Chancery Court found that Stewart’s long-standing 
friendship with two directors did not compromise their independence, as the court was 
persuaded that those directors would not harm their reputations by failing to fulfill their 
fiduciary duties.  Id. at 980.  However, the court chastised the plaintiff for not having 
used the “tools at hand” to obtain more facts on those friendships, and instead relying 
on general, conclusory statements.  Id. at 981-82.  But see California Pub. Employees’ 
Ret. Sys. v. Coulter, 2002 WL 31888343, at *9 (Del. Ch. 2002) (holding that while 
personal friendships, without more, outside business relationships, without more, and 
approving of or acquiescing in the challenged transaction, without more, are each 
insufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to a director’s ability to exercise independent 
business judgment, they can, taken together, create a reasonable doubt as to 
independence). 
 348. See supra Part II.E. 
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the suit.349  Another virtual trip to the Delaware courts will help explain. 
In 2001, four Oracle directors sold shares in Oracle allegedly on the 
basis of material non-public information.350  The non-public information 
related to “bugs” with an important new Oracle program, as well as 
declining sales of other products.351  This information revealed that the 
earnings projections Oracle had provided to the market were no longer 
accurate.352  Plaintiffs, stockholders in Oracle, sued the four defendant 
directors, alleging they breached their duty of loyalty in 
misappropriating insider information, and using it as the basis for 
making stock trades.353  Plaintiffs also sued the other Oracle directors, 
alleging that they had breached their duty of oversight by not correcting 
the misleading information in the market about Oracle’s performance in 
such a way so as to amount to bad faith.354
The Oracle board formed a SLC with two tenured Stanford 
professors to investigate whether dismissing the suit was in Oracle’s best 
interest.355  The SLC performed an extensive inquiry into the plaintiffs’ 
complaint, with significant involvement from its independent external 
counsel.356  Based on these investigations, the SLC determined that 
proceeding with the lawsuit was not in Oracle’s best interest, and moved 
to dismiss.357
Relying on Zapata v. Maldonado, the Chancery Court placed the 
burden on the SLC members to prove that: they were independent, acted 
in good faith, and had a reasonable basis for their recommendation to 
dismiss the suit.358  The two SLC members argued that they were 
independent because they did not receive compensation from Oracle 
other than as directors, and were in fact willing to return their fees for 
serving as SLC members if that was necessary to preserve their 
independence.359  Further, the SLC members were not on Oracle’s board 
 349. See id. 
 350. In re Oracle Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d 917, 921 (Del. Ch. 2003). 
 351. Id. at 922. 
 352. Id. at 921-22. 
 353. Id. at 923. 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. at 925. 
 357. Id. 
 358. Id. at 928 (citing Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788-89 (Del. 
1981)). 
 359. Id. at 929. 
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at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, and in their view, did not have 
any material ties with the defendant directors.360  But a number of ties 
between the SLC members and the defendant directors emerged during 
discovery.361  Specifically, it was discovered that one of the defendant 
directors had taught one of the SLC members while at Stanford, and was 
also on a Stanford policy committee with that same SLC member.362  
Another director personally made and directed, through a charitable 
institution, substantial donations to two organizations at Stanford with 
which one of the SLC members was affiliated.363  A third defendant, the 
CEO of Oracle, was the sole director of a charitable institution that had 
made substantial donations to Stanford.364  The CEO had also caused 
Oracle to make donations to Stanford, and was considering establishing 
a $170 million scholarship program through Stanford at the time of the 
challenged stock trades.365  The SLC members argued that these ties did 
not impair their independence, as they were both tenured professors who 
were not susceptible to professional punishment for making decisions 
adverse to the defendant directors.366  Additionally, their positions did 
not depend on their fund-raising efforts.367
The Chancery Court recognized that existing jurisprudence 
concerning the determination of independence focused on questions of 
domination and control.368  But, in the court’s view, “an emphasis on 
‘domination and control’ would serve only to fetishize much-parroted 
language, at the cost of denuding the independence inquiry of its 
intellectual integrity.”369  Recognizing that humans are not solely 
motivated by economic considerations, the court viewed independence 
contextually, looking to whether either SLC member was, for any 
substantial reason, incapable of making a decision with only the best 
interests of the corporation in mind.370  The court took notice of the new 
 360. Id. 
 361. In re Oracle Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d at 929. 
 362. Id. at 931. 
 363. Id. at 931-32. 
 364. Id. at 932. 
 365. Id. at 933. 
 366. Id. at 935-36. 
 367. Id. at 936. 
 368. Id. at 937. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. at 937-39. 
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definition of independence created under the Reform;371 while 
disfavoring the use of blanket labels in defining independence, the court 
supported the proposition recognized in the Reform that independence 
depends on the particular circumstances.372
Using this contextual approach, the Chancery Court found that the 
SLC had not proven the absence of a material fact regarding its 
members’ independence, as its report did not even mention the Stanford 
ties between the SLC members and the defendant directors.373  For the 
court, the significant question was whether a person in a SLC member’s 
position would find it difficult to assess a defendant director’s conduct 
without pondering his own association with that director and their 
mutual affiliations.374  A SLC member would not be considered 
independent of the director if that SLC member was unable to decide 
without that association “be[ing] on the[ir] mind.”375
One of the reasons for the court’s careful scrutiny of independence 
in Oracle is the extraordinary importance, and difficulty, facing SLC 
members who must decide whether to accuse a fellow director of 
misconduct with less than full board support.376  While this might 
explain why the Chancery Court found director independence in Beam 
but not in Oracle, it seems to be as difficult to decide whether to sue a 
director in the first instance as to decide to proceed with a suit against 
her.  Perhaps a better explanation is that the plaintiffs in Beam had the 
burden of proving the lack of board independence, whereas the directors 
in Oracle had the burden of establishing their independence.  Viewed 
this way, the allocation of the burden of proof may have a strong bearing 
on the nature and outcome of the independence inquiry.377  Moreover, if, 
 371. Id. at 940 n.62. 
 372. Id.  Vice Chancellors Chandler and Strine have noted that there is a great deal 
of harmony between the sentiments of the Reform and Delaware case law as to the 
independent director concept, particularly to the extent that the Reform recognizes the 
independence-compromising effects of consultant contracts, familial ties and other 
factors.  See Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 960-61.  Hence in the Vice Chancellors’ 
view, the Reform may have the virtue of simplifying some aspects of corporate 
litigation, as it gives clear guidance as to what does not amount to independence.  Id. at 
961. 
 373. In re Oracle Derivative Litig., 824 A.2d at 942-43. 
 374. See id. at 943. 
 375. See id. 
 376. See id. at 921, 940. 
 377. See Davis, supra note 168, at 1315 (arguing that the Chancery Court’s 
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as Vice Chancellor Strine has suggested, the heightened judicial scrutiny 
on independence seen in Oracle reflects heightened pressure from 
plaintiffs to presume that any tie with an interested director precludes a 
finding of independence, at least at the pleading stage, perhaps plaintiffs 
in other contexts will demand the same level of searching inquiry and 
skepticism, arguing that extraneous considerations should never be a 
factor in board decisions.378
The contextual and sensitive nature of the independence inquiries 
seen in Oracle and Krasner give the Delaware courts a significant 
amount of discretion in determining the point at which a director’s 
relationships, whether personal, familial, charitable or other, 
compromise his independence.  This might enable courts to find 
independence only where “the court feels that it can trust the 
directors.”379  Perhaps courts will be more willing to trust directors in 
less tumultuous times, when not faced with widespread skepticism as to 
directors’ ability to effectively and neutrally monitor management. 
3.  Independence—Where Delaware Law and the Reform Meet 
The Delaware trend towards scrutinizing a broad range of factors 
bearing on independence is consistent with the Reform’s call for greater 
director independence, particularly from management.380  This emphasis 
on independence, in both the context of board and committee 
 
outcome-determinative characterization of independence in Beam suggests that the 
court accepts some variance as a practical consequence of how the burden of proof is 
allocated). 
 378. See Strine, supra note 33, at 1383. 
 379. See id. at 1385 (referring to statements made by former Chief Justice Veasey). 
 380. Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 961 n.15 (“Delaware law recognizes that 
charitable relationships between a director and another constituent of the corporation (or 
the corporation itself) should be considered as factors in determining whether the 
director’s independence has been compromised.”); Veasey, Access to Justice, supra 
note 254, at 14 (noting that the independence concepts under the Reform are not 
inconsistent with Delaware case law, though are somewhat more explicit).  According 
to Vice Chancellors Chandler and Strine, “For the most part, it should be the case that 
satisfaction of the new Exchange Rule independence standards will enable a director, at 
least as a prima facie matter, to be labeled as ‘independent.’”  Chandler et al., supra 
note 21, at 988.  But see Brown, supra note 1, at 372 (indicating that SOX does not alter 
state law cases characterizing a director as independent, even though he has long-
standing business and personal ties to the chief executive officer). 
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composition under the Reform, and in the context of the board’s exercise 
of its duties under state fiduciary duty law, is not surprising following 
the discovery of widespread accounting abuses that unquestioning, 
passive boards largely missed because of their close ties to 
management.381  It also likely addresses the skepticism of judges as to 
whether there is such a thing as an “independent director,” given the 
heavy role management plays in selecting directors, the fact that 
independent directors are usually managers of other corporations, and 
the social affinities that exist between directors and managers.382
Despite the trend in Delaware towards harmonizing the 
independence determination in the fiduciary duty analysis with the 
Reform’s rules on independence, members of the Delaware judiciary 
have indicated that they do not agree with, and do not intend to follow, 
the Reform’s classification as non-independent directors who own, or 
are affiliated with a person who owns, a substantial but non-controlling 
block of stock.383  According to Vice Chancellors Chandler and Strine, 
this “is contrary to much good thinking in academia and in Delaware 
decision law, both of which have taken the view that independent 
directors who have a substantial stake as common stockholders in the 
company’s success are better motivated to diligently and faithfully 
oversee management.”384  This observation is especially relevant in the 
current environment, where stockholders are increasingly demanding to 
have their nominees placed on the board. 
Critics of the heightened independence mandate argue that 
independence does not always lead to improved firm performance.385  
However, independence likely eliminates or reduces competing personal 
 381. See Campos, supra note 164, at 540-41 (agreeing with Vice Chancellor Strine’s 
message in Oracle that in determining independence, it is important to look not only to 
specific requirements that exist (for example, through the NYSE and NASDAQ listing 
standards) but also to carefully consider any sort of relationship that could be deemed to 
impair independence); see also supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 382. See Strine, supra note 33, at 1374-75. 
 383. Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 989-96 (challenging the preclusion of a 
finding of independence under SOX where a director owns or is affiliated with a 
stockholder). 
 384. Id. at 992; see also Usha Rodrigues, Let the Money Do the Governing: The 
Case for Reuniting Ownership and Control, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 254, 256 (2004) 
(promoting inclusion of one stockholder nominee independent of management on the 
board). 
 385. Bhagat et al., supra note 167; see Davis, supra note 168, at 1340. 
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interests that might “be on the mind” of a director when making a 
business decision.  This, in turn, likely gives stockholders a greater sense 
of impartiality, important in an environment when the corporate parade 
of evils has been seemingly commanded by conflicted, passive directors. 
C.  Duty of Candor/Disclosure Post-Reform 
In Emerging Communications, presented above, the Delaware 
Chancery Court found that the directors of Emerging Communications 
had breached their duty of disclosure to the stockholders by failing to 
provide current financial projections of Emerging Communications that 
reflected its true value.386  Thus, the stockholders’ approval was 
ineffective under Section 144(a) of the DGCL.387  While the Chancery 
Court acknowledged that projections were not required to be provided to 
the stockholders as a matter of course, the fact that they had been 
provided to Prosser, the sole stockholder of Innovative Communications, 
meant that they had to be provided to all stockholders, and the failure to 
do so was a material omission.388  The Chancery Court also found that 
the proxy material was materially misleading in that it suggested that the 
members of the special committee were independent when in fact they 
were not, and in stating that the special committee comprised a majority 
of the board, although it did not.389  For that reason, along with others 
cited, the court found that the merger price was not the product of fair 
dealing, and the defendant directors had not proven the fairness of the 
transaction.390
As section B presented, Delaware’s standard of independence is 
changing as stockholders expect and demand directors with more pluck 
who are independent from, and who are willing to question, 
management.  As Emerging Communications shows, this emphasis 
emerges again in the stockholder solicitation context, where directors 
must, under their duty of candor, disclose to stockholders any 
relationship that might bear on the board’s independent approval of an 
interested party transaction.  This again reveals the Delaware courts’ 
 
 386. In re Emerging Commc’ns Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 70, at *131-32 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
 387. See discussion supra Parts II.B, II.C. 
 388. In re Emerging Commc’ns, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 70, at *134. 
 389. Id. at *135. 
 390. Id. at *116-37. 
458 FORDHAM JOURNAL OF Vol. XII 
 CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
emphasis on the need to assure stockholders of the integrity and fairness 
of board processes through independence. 
While Delaware’s duty of candor does not derive from compliance 
with specific disclosure obligations under federal securities laws, 
Delaware courts have given deference to federal disclosure standards in 
shaping the state fiduciary duty of candor.391  Consequently, a violation 
of any of the new SOX disclosure obligations placed on public 
companies may give rise to a state law fiduciary duty of candor claim, or 
may eliminate the cleansing effect of stockholder approval of an 
interested party transaction and also prove the absence of fairness. 
Perhaps more significant, as companies implement enhanced 
information and reporting systems, they generate mountains of 
additional information about internal processes, plans, procedures and 
the like.  Much of this is reported to the audit committee.  This greatly 
expands the definition of information that is “reasonably available” and 
that may need to be provided to stockholders when soliciting their 
approval.  Further, public companies must periodically report the 
information generated by these enhanced systems to their stockholders.  
This disclosure may significantly increase the types of fiduciary duty 
claims that stockholders are able prove. 
D.  Are We There Yet? 
While directors may take some comfort from the fact that their 
fiduciary duties have not been turned inside-out and upside-down amidst 
the ambitious corporate governance reform, the changes that have 
occurred in the short time since the Reform took effect are notable.  
Most importantly, Delaware courts seem poised to employ good faith 
through the duty of loyalty to enforce directors’ discharge of their 
oversight responsibilities.392  As Stone demonstrates, directors who 
intentionally or consciously disregard those responsibilities may be held 
liable as a result of breaching their duty of loyalty.  As Disney instructs, 
even a director who jumps over the minimum standard of conduct hurdle 
can still face protracted litigation and court reprimand for sub-par 
conduct.  This is particularly significant, as directors have an increasing 
 
 391. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 392. Janssen, supra note 25, at 1593 (suggesting that the failure of care, loyalty and 
waste claims has led to enforcement of the duty of good faith). 
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number of oversight responsibilities to discharge.393
Director independence is a corollary to the duty of oversight, aimed 
at enhancing directors’ ability to perform their responsibilities without 
associations that can compromise their impartiality or effectiveness.  
Toward that end, the Delaware courts have been scrutinizing a broad 
range of factors that might impair independence, supported by the 
Reform’s expansive list of factors precluding a finding of independence.  
The consequence of a broader independence inquiry, as Oracle and 
Krasner show, is that it allows stockholders to throw more challenges to 
director independence at the court, increasing the chances that one of 
those challenges will stick.  Those cases also seem to cast a wider net on 
what directors must consider and investigate where they have the burden 
of establishing their independence.  Directors can take some comfort 
from the message of members of the Delaware judiciary that the lack of 
independence does not equate to being interested for purposes of the 
duty of loyalty.  However, the two concepts converge where a majority 
of independent directors approves an interested party transaction, yet the 
directors are not able to establish their independence at trial, as in 
Krasner.  The result is the application of the fairness standard of review; 
a standard allowing a court to review the substance of a transaction for 
fairness, often resulting in a different outcome than where a court defers 
to the directors’ exercise of business judgment.394  Independence might 
also overlap with good faith to the extent that a non-independent 
director’s approval of an interested party transaction is used to prove 
that the director acted with bad faith or without fully investigating 
whether she was in fact independent, in conscious disregard of her duty 
to do so. 
That is not to say that the Delaware courts “have lurched into a new 
and menacing direction that should cause panic in the boardroom.”395  
 393. See E. Norman Veasey, A Perspective on Liability Risks to Directors in Light 
of Current Events, 19 INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR 9, 11 (2005) [hereinafter, 
Veasey, Perspective] (“The evolution of director expectations occurs not only because 
courts must decide only the cases before them, but also because business norms and 
mores change as well over time.”). 
 394. See supra note 328 and accompanying text. 
 395. According to the former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, E. 
Norman Veasey, Caremark made clear that the expectation is that the board will 
implement modern governance norms, including effective law compliance programs.  
Veasey, Perspective, supra note 393, at 13. 
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But current Delaware case law suggests that the standards directors are 
judged by are evolving, as perhaps they should, to meet changing 
demands and the evolving corporate governance mandates reflected in 
the Reform. 
So how does a director satisfy her evolving fiduciary duty?  That is 
the topic of Part V. 
V.  HOW DOES A DIRECTOR DISCHARGE HER  
EVER-ELUSIVE FIDUCIARY DUTIES? 
Being a director of a corporation is not an easy task—nor one to be 
taken lightly.  That is particularly true in an environment where the 
corporate governance scale has been tipping towards increasing 
directors’ oversight responsibilities and making them accountable to 
stockholders.396  The corporate governance scale may have needed an 
adjustment after the bursting of the dot-com and telecom bubbles 
because directors in many instances had failed to serve as an effective 
check on management’s practices of engaging in short-term market 
manipulations to increase the price of stock,397 and to introduce a 
healthy dose of skepticism into the boardroom. 
The biggest and most immediate adjustment to the corporate 
governance scale originated with the Reform.  By mandating specific 
oversight duties audit committee directors must perform and 
qualifications directors must have, the Reform does not leave much 
room to question what, at a minimum, is expected from directors along 
these lines.  That might explain why directors of companies not subject 
to the Reform are also implementing Reform-style governance 
practices,398 for they too understand that the bar has been raised and that 
more is expected of them. 
While the Reform increased the expected level of director conduct, 
Delaware courts have been adjusting the standard of review for that 
conduct.399  Prior to the enactment of the Reform, Delaware courts did 
 396. See discussion supra Parts III-IV. 
 397. See Coffee, supra note 128, at 298 (arguing that there was an incentive to 
inflate the price of stock by premature revenue recognition, enabling management to 
bail out in the short-term by exercising options and immediately selling their stock). 
 398. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 399. A standard of review is a test that a court applies when it reviews an actor’s 
conduct to determine whether or not to impose liability or grant injunctive relief.  
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not generally provide stockholders with a remedy for directors’ 
oversight lapses, whether or not involving a business decision, absent a 
conflict of interest.400  But by shifting their focus to good faith, and 
performing the fiduciary duty analysis using that standard, the Delaware 
courts have indicated a willingness and way to enforce directors’ 
oversight responsibilities through personal liability.  Just as the 
Delaware courts use the business judgment rule to implement a policy of 
judicial deference to business decisions,401 so too has good faith become 
a tool by which those courts have started to implement a policy of giving 
more careful scrutiny and attention to ordinary business decisions and 
oversight responsibilities.  Thus, as the standard of conduct requires 
directors to perform an increased number of oversight duties, the 
standard of review has shifted closer, exposing a director to an increased 
risk of personal liability for failing to perform his duties in good faith.  
That is not to say that there has been a wild swing in fiduciary duty law 
following the Reform.  The fact that the directors of both Disney and 
AmSouth were not adjudged liable seems to demonstrate the continuing 
trend in Delaware towards director absolution.  However, cases such as 
Disney and Stone, where the Delaware courts gave substantial attention 
to the performance by the directors of their routine duties and measured 
the board failures by a standard of liability that is coming more into 
focus, suggest a new direction for the Delaware courts. 
Moreover, personal liability for oversight failures is not the only 
land mine directors may encounter; as in Disney, directors may face 
years of litigation even where their conduct does not amount to bad 
faith.  Further still, also seen in Disney, directors face the risk of court 
rebuke for failing to employ best practices.  For directors, who are often 
esteemed members of society,402 this type of public rebuke can seriously 
harm their reputations and impair their business prospects. 
Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 437.  A standard of conduct provides how an actor should 
conduct a given activity or play a given role.  Id.  Often the standard of review and 
standard of conduct diverge, for example, in the case of the duty of care, where 
Delaware courts expect directors to employ best practices, yet give deference to their 
business decisions under the business judgment rule.  Id. at 443. 
 400. See discussion supra Part II. 
 401. Allen et al., supra note 3, at 1294-95. 
 402. See Lynn A. Stout, On the Proper Motives of Corporate Directors (Or, Why 
You Don’t Want to Invite Homo Economicus to Join Your Board), 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 
4 (2003) (noting that directors are generally successful professionals). 
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Delaware courts have also been able to more closely align standards 
of review with changing standards of conduct by expanding the scope of 
the independence review.  A decision made by a SLC comprised of 
independent, disinterested directors prevents a court from hearing the 
merits of a case.  Independent board approval also prevents a court from 
reviewing an interested party transaction for fairness.  In both cases, 
where the independence of directors involved in the approval process is 
questioned, a court has broad discretion, given the contextual fact-
specific nature of the independence inquiry, to determine whether that 
lack of independence impugned the approval process.  Where a court 
finds that the approval process has been impugned, the court may review 
the transaction and determine whether it satisfies the applicable standard 
of review.403  Thus, by giving more teeth to the independence inquiry, 
the courts have increased the likelihood that they will review director 
conduct and, in the case of interested party transactions, that they will 
review the fairness of those transactions. 
Though the standard of review appears to be approaching the 
heightened standard of post-Reform conduct, the two still appear to be 
on separate planes.  As Chancellor Chandler has noted, 
Delaware law does not—indeed, the common law cannot—hold 
fiduciaries liable for a failure to comply with the aspirational ideal of 
best practices, any more than a common-law court deciding a 
medical malpractice dispute can impose a standard of liability based 
on ideal—rather than competent or standard-medical treatment 
practices, lest the average medical practitioner be found inevitably 
derelict.404
Though the Delaware courts have not expounded on what amounts 
to best practices, they have been quick to note conduct that does not 
measure up.  For instance in Disney IV, the Delaware Chancery Court 
pointed out numerous instances where the directors’ conduct fell short of 
 403. Veasey, Perspective, supra note 393, at 10 (“[T]here are some court cases 
where directors may be held personally accountable.  But they are not, in my opinion, a 
menacing trend and are explainable as law and business mores and expectations of 
directors’ processes continue to evolve.”); but see id. at 11 (“The fact that the standards 
of review applied by Delaware courts to the standards of director conduct has resulted 
in some findings of wrongdoing is primarily a function of intensified judicial focus on 
process and improved pleadings by plaintiffs’ lawyers.”). 
 404. See Disney IV, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, at *4-5, aff’d C.A. No. 15452, 2006 
Del. LEXIS 307 (Del. 2006). 
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best practices.405  Similarly, in Disney V, the Delaware Supreme Court 
repeatedly rebuked the directors for failing to comply with best 
practices.  This suggests that compliance with best practices may be a 
director’s insurance policy against the risks that he will be held liable for 
having breached his fiduciary duties, or that he will be rebuked for 
failing to employ best practices.  It may also prevent a director from 
facing time-consuming litigation, as his conduct will at least be on the 
same plane as stockholders’ expectations. 
Compliance with good corporate practices, somewhere above bad 
faith but falling short of best practices, may or may not preclude a 
director from being reprimanded by a court or involved in protracted 
litigation.  It is not clear from Disney how short the Disney directors’ 
conduct fell from aspirational practices.  Still, their conduct was 
sufficient for them to avoid personal liability.  As former Chief Justice 
Veasey has previously noted, “Good corporate practices, when 
genuinely used, in my view, would perforce and simultaneously lead 
directors to act in good faith.”406  In this way, compliance with good 
corporate practices seems to serve as an insurance policy against the risk 
of liability for a breach of the duty of loyalty for actions taken in bad 
faith. 
Because the Delaware courts have not been clear as to what 
amounts to good or best practices, it is difficult to know both where the 
line between the two is drawn and the differences between them.  In 
fact, there may still be more layers between good practices and bad faith, 
such as competent practices or adequate practices.  But even without 
fully understanding all of the levels of conduct that might fall between 
the two, it seems clear that the Delaware courts intend to encourage best 
practices, and are willing to use available tools, short of imposing 
liability, to bring about the employment of those practices.407
 405. See, e.g., id. at *191 (“By virtue of his Machiavellian (and imperial) nature as 
CEO . . . Eisner to a large extent is responsible for the failings in process that infected 
and handicapped the board’s decision making abilities.”). 
 406. Veasey, Counseling Directors, supra note 141, at 1456; see also Hamilton et 
al., supra note 2, at 25 (stating that ideals of good corporate governance practices that 
go beyond the minimal legal requirements are desirable, tend to benefit stockholders, 
and can usually help directors avoid liability). 
 407. This is consistent with Professor Eisenberg’s view that standards of conduct 
(such as best practices) are “safe” rules and standards of review (such as good faith) are 
“risky” rules.  See Eisenberg, supra note 4, at 464.  According to Professor Eisenberg, a 
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So what amounts to best corporate practices?  Not surprisingly, it 
depends.  Specifically, what amounts to best practices will invariably 
depend on the circumstances408 and will vary by company, depending on 
factors such as industry,409 number of stockholders410 and size.411  As 
Vice Chancellors Chandler and Strine have noted, “there must be room 
[in fiduciary law] for creativity and innovation and that the law must 
accommodate the diversity that exists in corporate America.”412  Perhaps 
the fact that best practices are as amorphous as good faith will allow the 
Delaware courts to draw an imaginary line between them, allowing any 
director who conforms his conduct to a standard of conduct knows that he is safe from 
liability, whereas a director who relies only on the standard of review that is less 
demanding is at risk that the standard of review will be deemed inapplicable and 
liability will be imposed under the standard of conduct.  Id.  Some studies indicate that 
there is a positive relationship between good corporate governance and firm value.  
BNA Inc., 3 Corporate Accountability Report 57 (2005) (referring to empirical 
evidence that shows that there is a link between returns and governance).  If there is 
indeed a positive correlation, implementing good corporate practices can be rationalized 
not only as a liability avoidance measure, but also as a value creation measure for 
stockholders. 
 408. Allen et al., supra note 3, at 1294.  Allen notes reasons why courts have had 
trouble defining precise guidelines: 
[T]he almost infinite potential variation in the fact patterns calling for director 
decisions, the disparate time frames within which different boards may be required to 
act, and the divergent skills and information needed to make particular business 
decisions, usually make it impossible for courts to articulate ex ante precise guidelines 
for appropriate fiduciary action in future cases. 
Id. 
 409. For example, best practices for a high-tech company with a complicated 
business plan would be different than for a company that manufactures widgets. 
 410. Generally speaking, the more dispersed and passive the stockholder base, the 
more stockholders rely on directors to oversee management.  See Jonathan R. Macey, 
Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 
401 (2004) (noting that diverse share ownership limits stockholders’ involvement in 
corporate governance); John F. Olson et al., Composing a Balanced and Effective Board 
to Meet New Governance Mandates, 59 BUS. LAW. 421, 429 (2004) (noting the trade-
off between corporate control by stockholders and liquidity). 
 411. Aulana Peters, Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Congress’ Response to Corporate 
Scandals: Will The New Rules Guarantee “Good” Governance and Avoid Future 
Scandals?, 28 NOVA L. REV. 283, 284, 292 (2004) (noting that it is open for debate 
what constitutes good corporate governance and that no one set of governance rules fit 
all firms and situations). 
 412. Chandler et al., supra note 21, at 978.  The downside to variable good corporate 
governance practices is that it is difficult to know what they are. 
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wave of corporate governance reform to erase the line and the Delaware 
courts to redraw it.  The Reform has indeed shifted the line, with many 
former best practices now constituting a statutory minimum that must be 
implemented to comply with fiduciary duties.  Still, the Delaware 
courts’ adherence to the doctrine of stare decisis, and the slow evolution 
of decisional law, should give directors the opportunity—at least 
directors who are paying attention to their duties—to understand and 
adjust their conduct to meet evolving expectations. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
While competent, good, or best corporate practices vary from 
circumstance to circumstance, from company to company, and from 
time to time, the one common denominator is the need for directors to 
act in the best interest of stockholders.  That seems to be the common 
trend found under the new duties and legal mandates under the Reform 
and state fiduciary duty law.  Federal securities laws, SRO rules, 
organizational sentencing guidelines and state corporate law are all 
geared towards encouraging a corporate culture of wanting to do the 
right thing—though they differ on how to bring that about.413  The 
approach taken by the Reform—of enumerating specific responsibilities 
currently viewed as desirable by stockholders—seems to be bringing 
about conduct that gives the appearance of directors acting with the best 
interests of the stockholders in mind.  However, that approach may not 
be sustainable in the long term, as stockholders’ expectations continue to 
shift to reflect the continually evolving nature of business.  Delaware’s 
duty of good faith may be more appropriately suited for the task, as it 
affords courts, in an environment where stockholders’ expectations are 
continually evolving, the opportunity to look to the entire process 
employed by directors as a proxy for the directors’ good faith state of 
mind.414  Yet it remains to be seen how, and to what extent, Delaware 
and other state courts can and will use good faith through the duty of 
 413. See Johnson, supra note 6, at 39 (arguing that commentary from Delaware 
judges as well as remarks made by Chancellor Chandler in Disney IV “suggest that the 
key issue with respect to analyzing good faith is whether the director’s motivation and 
purpose was to advance the corporation’s interest”). 
 414. See Johnson et al., supra note 6, at 1194 (suggesting that the broad, ill-defined 
fiduciary duties in Delaware accord wide latitude to directors, which is highly 
functional given the strong process dimension to fiduciary analysis). 
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loyalty to bring about the “do the right thing” mindset. 
But even with a standards-based approach, the method of 
encouraging best practices continues to focus on the disciplining stick 
and not the rewarding carrot.  Perhaps a better approach is to make 
directors want to do the right thing.  Directors might be encouraged to 
uphold high ethical business standards, not out of fear of facing possible 
stockholder derivative suits or court reprimand, but because they are 
rewarded for acting honestly and ethically, possibly through a financial 
bonus or positive corporate disclosure.  This will be more effective if all 
corporations implement a similar incentive system, as stockholders will 
then be able to compare directors’ performance from corporation to 
corporation.  Ultimately, while the threat of liability might be sufficient 
to prevent a director from engaging in certain practices, it may make 
more sense to encourage aspirational conduct by inspiring directors to 
engage in honest and ethical conduct. 
 
